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This Article takes a comprehensive look at the failure of Title VII as
a system for claiming nondiscrimination rights. The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
requiring an employee to assert a Title VII pay discrimination claim
within 180/300 days of when the discriminatory pay decision was
first made, marks the tip of the iceberg in this flawed system. In the
past decade, Title VII doctrines at both ends of the rights-claiming
process have become increasingly hostile to employees. At the front
end, Title VII imposes strict requirements on employees to promptly
report and assert claims of discrimination. These requirements
leave little room for gaps in knowledge, hesitation in responding, or
fears of retaliation to delay rights-claiming. The model of rightsclaiming behavior at the heart of this doctrine contrasts starkly with
extensive social science research on how people perceive and
respond to discrimination in the real world. The juxtaposition of
Title VII doctrine with this social science literature reveals a
fundamentally flawed framework for asserting discrimination rights.
Employees make out poorly at the other end of the rights-claiming
process, too. Those employees who do step forward to complain of
discrimination are left with grossly inadequate protection from
retaliation. Recent developments in retaliation law have weakened
protections for employees, reinforcing the very reasons employees
are unlikely to assert nondiscrimination rights in the first place.
Together, Title VII’s prompt complaint and retaliation doctrines
create an untenable framework for employees deserving of the law’s
substantive protections. Rather than salvaging this system, the
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recent trend toward employer-sponsored internal processes for
resolving discrimination complaints exacerbates these flaws in ways
that have yet to be acknowledged. This Article marks an important
contribution to the literature on Title VII and discrimination law, as
the first major examination of how Title VII functions as a rightsclaiming system.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent controversial ruling, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,1 a divided Supreme Court severely undercut the ability of pay
discrimination claimants to enforce their rights under Title VII, the main
federal employment discrimination statute.2 In its decision, the Court
applied the statute of limitations in a way that ignored the realities of both
pay discrimination claims specifically and workplace bias claims more
generally.3 While particularly devastating for pay discrimination claimants,
Ledbetter is only the tip of the iceberg. As a result of many intersecting
doctrines, and the realities of how employees experience and respond to
discrimination, Title VII has become a failure as a rights-claiming system.
This Article explores the conflicts for employees created by the gap
between Title VII’s regime for invoking its protections and the workplace
realities of perceiving and claiming discrimination. Most discrimination
scholarship focuses on the substantive reach of discrimination law. Over
the years, that body of work has developed a rich critique of the
shortcomings of law’s conception of discrimination and the deeper, more
subtle forms of bias that it fails to reach, including a well-documented
critique of the gap between law’s aspirations and the realities of workplace
bias. Our focus here is different: we scrutinize Title VII’s regime for
claiming antidiscrimination rights—a purportedly neutral set of procedures
that govern access to the law’s substantive protections—and conclude that
it falls far short of what is necessary to provide meaningful access to the
law’s substantive rights.
The effectiveness of Title VII depends on the law’s success in
providing employees with access to its substantive guarantees of
nondiscrimination and protecting them from retaliation when they seek to
enforce them. Title VII’s enforcement framework depends on employees’
willingness to step forward and act, in effect, as “private attorneys general”
1. 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). Soon after Ledbetter was decided, a bill to undo
the ruling was introduced in Congress. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831,
110th Cong. (2007) (introduced June 22, 2007). The bill was passed by the House of
Representatives and is currently pending in the Senate. See Bill Summary for H.R. 2831,
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). President Bush, however, issued a formal
statement of opposition to the Act. See Executive Office of the President, Statement of
Administration Policy: H.R. 2831—Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (July 27, 2007),
available at http:www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2831sap-r.pdf.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000 & Supp. 2004). Though not an exclusive remedy
for employees, Title VII is the broadest-ranging federal antidiscrimination law and entitles
employees to seek both equitable relief and money damages for violations.
3. For a focused critique of Ledbetter, see Joanna Grossman & Deborah Brake, The
Supreme Court Slams the Door on Pay Discrimination Claims: The Ruling in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., FINDLAW’S WRIT, June 4, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
commentary/20070604_brake.html.
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to enforce the law.4 As the Second Circuit recently observed, “Title VII
combats unlawful employment practices . . . principally through reliance on
employee initiative.”5 Yet, at many different junctures, employees are
stymied and deterred in their efforts to take this initiative.
We explore, here, the intersection between rights-claiming rules and
employee behavior—the ability of injured individuals to avail themselves
of rights and remedies provided by law. The path from injury to internal
dispute resolution or lawsuit is not self-executing; instead, there is a
complex social process that must occur between those two points. In a
pathbreaking article published more than two decades ago, Felstiner, Abel,
and Sarat focused on this social process and “the way in which experiences
become grievances, grievances become disputes, and disputes take various
shapes.”6 The authors set forth three stages in the emergence of disputes:
naming (“saying to oneself that a particular experience has been
injurious”); blaming (“when a person attributes an injury to the fault of
another individual or social entity”); and claiming (“when someone with a
grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and
asks for some remedy”).7 All three transformations must occur in order for
an aggrieved individual to gain access to justice.8 Predictably, the smallest
category of the “dispute pyramid” is at the top—those injurious
experiences that end up in court.9 Discrimination injuries are no exception.
An analysis by Laura Beth Nielson and Robert Nelson, which puts “data on
formal complaints together with data on the reported prevalence of

4. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
5. Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2005).
6. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 632
(1980).
7. Id. at 635–36. On this social process, see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 11–26 (1983); Richard E. Miller &
Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 525, 536–42 (1980); Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden Domains of Civil Justice:
“Naming, Blaming, and Claiming” in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 426–29 (2000).
8. As Beth Quinn has observed in the sexual harassment context,
a victim must identify the behavior as harassment, recognize the availability
of a legal remedy, and report her victimization to some forum in some
manner. Sexual harassment is a civil complaint; the victim must come to
and stand before the law—whether informally through her employer’s
legally derived policies or directly to the state.
Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday
Work World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1155 (2000).
9. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 681.
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discrimination,”10 confirmed the existence of a rights-claiming regime that
produces a “dramatic amount of underclaiming.”11
Our analysis of rights-claiming in the employment discrimination
context directly implicates the problems of naming, blaming, and claiming.
The doctrines and social processes we analyze relate to the perception of
workplace harm (naming), attribution of a discriminatory motive to the
employer (blaming), and the myriad obstacles to challenging discrimination
(claiming). Against the backdrop of this useful taxonomy, we consider why
employment discrimination injuries do not translate easily into legal
claims.
A successful rights-claiming system must respond to employees’
needs at both ends of the rights-claiming process, enabling and encouraging
employees whose rights are violated to come forward and protecting them
from possible retaliation when they do. The soundness of a rights-claiming
system is best evaluated holistically because the dynamics of rightsclaiming at every stage are interactive. The failure to adequately encourage
and enable rights-claiming contributes to an environment where rightsclaiming is aberrational, increasing the likelihood that employees who do
complain will be viewed as troublemakers and provoke retaliation. Perhaps
even more significantly, inadequate protection from retaliation reinforces
the obstacles that suppress rights-claiming in the first place. Title VII thus
fails employees at each point in the rights-claiming process.
Title VII’s requirements for reporting and challenging discrimination
reveal a view of “employee initiative”—how employees perceive and
respond to discrimination—that is contrary to the way these processes
actually take place. The law’s timely filing and reporting doctrines take as
their worthy claimant a person who quickly and accurately perceives
discrimination and responds by promptly challenging it, undeterred by the
social costs of complaining or the prospect of retaliation. Many employees
do not measure up to these expectations—they consistently “name,”
“blame,” and “claim” less well than courts expect—and are thus unable to
invoke the law’s substantive protections.

10. Id. at 703.
11. Id. at 665 (“The present system may police against egregious forms of discrimination,
but for many who perceive themselves to be victims of discrimination, their rights remain
unrealized.”). Analyzing all available data on race discrimination, the authors concluded that “of
3.4 million potential race claimants, only 28,912 file an EEOC complaint, and only about 7,500
file a federal lawsuit. . . . After looking at these numbers, we are inclined to ask not why there are
so many discrimination claims, but why there are so few.” Id. at 706; see also Felstiner, Abel &
Sarat, supra note 6, at 651 (“The transformation perspective suggests that there may be too little
conflict in our society. . . . It encourages inquiry into why so few such individuals even get some
redress.”).
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The law fails employees at the other end of the rights-claiming process
as well. Employees who overcome these obstacles and manage to assert
their rights are left without adequate protection from retaliation for doing
so. Contrary to judicial rhetoric promising generous protection from
retaliation,12 Title VII leaves employees unprotected from significant
retaliatory harms, adding to the very vulnerabilities that make employees
circumspect about challenging discrimination in the first place. The
increasingly strict approach federal judges have taken to interpreting Title
VII’s timely filing and reporting doctrines and their increasing dilution of
the law’s protection from retaliation combine to create a double-bind for
employees who experience discrimination.13 The result is a rights-claiming
system that is extremely difficult for employees to navigate safely.
The increasing privatization of employment disputes—a recent trend
noted by many scholars—adds to the severity and nature of the problems
we identify.14 By channeling bias claims into internal dispute resolution
processes, in lieu of or as a prerequisite to the pursuit of formal statutory
remedies, employers have effectively added another layer of obstacles to
the enforcement of employees’ statutory rights. Although employers
increasingly direct or require employees to exhaust internal grievance
procedures before filing lawsuits, Title VII’s timely filing requirements are
not tolled in the interim. The clock may run out on an employee who
delays filing formal charges in the hopes of resolving the dispute internally.
Internal dispute resolution processes also further jeopardize employee
protections against retaliation, which are watered down for participation in
extra-statutory processes, even if the employee had little choice about
whether to pursue them.
Part I of this Article chronicles the various doctrines that obligate
employees to promptly challenge and report violations of Title VII rights.
These doctrines include the statute of limitations, the definition of the acts
that trigger the limitations period, equitable tolling and discovery rules, the
special rules for reporting and challenging sexual harassment, and the role
of internal employer procedures in the timing requirements for formally
12. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
13. Others have examined the judicial doctrines and tendencies that undercut Title VII’s
substantive protections. See, e.g., Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 9, at 673–80 (examining the
pattern of legislative expansion and judicial retrenchment in antidiscrimination law); Tristin K.
Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear,
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026054 (describing the tendency of federal courts toward
“insular individualism”—“the belief that discrimination can be reduced to the action of an
individual decisionmaker (or decisionmakers) isolated from the work environment and the
employer”—that undercuts employees’ protection from workplace discrimination).
14. See infra notes 125–33 and accompanying text.
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asserting Title VII rights. Each of these doctrines presupposes an ideal
claimant who is fully aware of her rights, quickly perceives discrimination,
and does not falter or hesitate to challenge discrimination through the
prescribed channels. Together, they function to close off substantive
protections from employees who do not match the law’s ideal.
Part II turns to the extensive social science literature on how people
actually perceive and respond to discrimination to contrast the law’s ideal
claimant with the realities of workers’ lives. This Part parses two distinct
bodies of literature: research on the processes of perceiving discrimination
and the study of how people respond when they do perceive discrimination.
Contrary to the law’s implicit assumption that employees immediately
know when they have experienced discrimination, knowledge of
discrimination is obscured and suppressed by several psychological
processes.
As a result, most social psychologists believe that
underperception of discrimination, rather than hypervigilance, is the norm.
The law also falls wide of the mark in its assumptions about how people
respond to discrimination. Far from the assertive complainant the law
requires, people rarely respond to perceived discrimination with prompt
complaints and challenges. Indeed, the reality of how people respond
contrasts sharply not only with how judges envision employees will act, but
also with how employees themselves expect they would respond to
discrimination. People share a widespread belief that, if confronted with
discrimination, they would challenge it immediately. In fact, when faced
with such circumstances, they do the opposite. This gap between
expectation and reality is deeply embedded in Title VII doctrine, with
devastating consequences.
Finally, Part III examines Title VII’s effectiveness at the end of the
rights-claiming process, identifying major gaps in the law’s protection from
retaliation. This Part examines recent developments in two major
doctrines—the materially adverse standard and the reasonable belief
requirement—which together leave gaping holes in the law’s protection
from retaliation. Although the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White15 purported to
expand retaliation protections to prohibit employer actions that “well might
have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination,’ ”16 lower courts have undermined protection for
employees with cramped interpretations of this standard. As a result, many
employer actions that are likely to deter actual employees from
15. 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
16. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (emphasis added) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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complaining are left undisturbed and unregulated, reinforcing the very
concerns that deter discrimination complaints in the first place. Perhaps
even more critically, another doctrine, the requirement that an employee
have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct is unlawful before
complaining of discrimination, creates enormous risks for employees
considering whether to challenge perceived discrimination. Recent lower
court decisions have made this underexamined doctrine one of the biggest
threats to rights-claiming under the statute. This Part brings our look at
Title VII’s rights-claiming process full circle, demonstrating the
predicament created by a structure that imposes a rigid set of requirements
for quickly asserting nondiscrimination rights but provides insufficient
protection from retaliation for claimants.
Ultimately, we conclude that even apart from critiques of the law’s
substantive reach in defining discrimination, Title VII is fundamentally
flawed as a rights-claiming system.
I. TITLE VII’S PROMPT COMPLAINT DOCTRINES
At many different junctures, Title VII law makes assumptions about
discrimination victims: what they know, when they know it, and how they
respond to the information they are assumed to have. The law then takes
these assumptions and translates them into requirements: employees must
quickly perceive and promptly report discrimination in order to invoke the
substantive protections of antidiscrimination law.
Numerous doctrines under Title VII place pressure on employees to
recognize and challenge discrimination quickly when they experience it.
They include the short statute of limitations, strict rules defining the acts
that trigger it, inadequate tolling and discovery rules, a special set of
requirements for reporting harassment, and an all-but-mandatory extra
layer of internal dispute resolution that does not extend the time for
formally asserting rights. As a whole, this body of doctrine leaves little
room for uncertainty or hesitation and requires a high degree of employee
awareness and vigilance in the assertion of Title VII rights.
A.

The Limitations Period

At the root of the problem for rights-claiming under Title VII is the
statute’s unusually short statute of limitations. Under current law, an
employee must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within “[180] days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred” or within 300 days if the claim
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goes directly to a state work-sharing agency.17 As enacted in 1964, the
original statute had a charge-filing period of only ninety days.18
Subsequent amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 extended this period to the current limit, over opponents’ claims that
the extension would lead to “stale charges” and “indefinite liabilities.”19
The 180/300-day limitations period was patterned after the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).20 Though reconciling Title VII’s statute of
limitations with that under the NLRA was an express goal of the 1972 Act,
there are significant differences in the ease of identifying unlawful
practices under each statute. Employers who commit unfair labor practices
under the NLRA (by, say, firing union sympathizers) often do so in the
context of a union organizing drive or in situations where there is already
an incumbent union. In either of those situations, there is a relatively savvy
institutional player—the union—with a familiarity with the law and an
institutional structure designed to channel an employee’s vague feelings of
unfairness into an unfair labor practice charge with the appropriate regional
office of the National Labor Relations Board.21 For Title VII claimants,

17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). The EEOC has delegated to state fair
employment agencies the power to “grant or seek relief” from discriminatory practices made
unlawful by Title VII. Id. As the Court explained in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002),
[i]n a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with
respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially files a
grievance with that agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300
days of the employment practice; in all other States, the charge must be filed
within 180 days.
Id. at 109. Claims that are first filed with a so-called “deferral agency” are governed by a longer
EEOC deadline so that the state agency has time to investigate. The vast majority of claimants
have access to a state deferral agency and, thus, to the longer 300-day limitations period. See
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 471 (1988) (noting that only a “few
jurisdictions, primarily in the Southeast . . . do not have agencies which enforce fair employment
practice laws”). Both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”) employ the same limitations period as Title VII. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d)(1) (2000) (adopting 180/300-day limitations period for ADEA claims); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (2000) (stating that employment discrimination claims under the ADA are governed
by Title VII’s procedural requirements, including the 180/300-day limitations period).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000)).
19. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 65–66 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2174–75;
see also Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706(e), 86 Stat. 103,
105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000)).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000) (charge must be filed with National Labor Relations
Board within six months of the alleged unfair labor practice); H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 65
(minority views on H.R. 1746) (explaining desire to match the NLRA limitations period).
21. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes
as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55,
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however, there is no such institutional intermediary to help them navigate
the rights-claiming process.22 Instead, they must act individually to file
necessary internal and administrative complaints in order to preserve
judicial remedies and obtain counsel to pursue them.23 Given these
differences, the unusually short NLRA limitations period is a poor fit for
Title VII. Title VII plaintiffs are much more in the shoes of personal injury
tort plaintiffs than employees protected by the NLRA and should be
regulated by the much longer statute of limitations that typically applies to
tort claims.24
Congress revisited the limitations period in 1990. The Civil Rights
Act of 1990, a bill that Congress passed but the first President Bush vetoed,
was designed to override a number of Supreme Court rulings that had
narrowed the scope of Title VII’s substantive protections against
discrimination.25 It also included a provision extending the limitations
period to two years in order to more closely match other federal laws,
including those federal antidiscrimination laws that give employees a
longer limitations period.26 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, for example,
applies a two-year limitations period, extended to three years if the
violation is willful.27 Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era federal law
prohibiting race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts,
including those between employer and employee, contains no express

61–62 (2004) (arguing that unions should obtain legal counsel and provide other assistance
needed so that employees can pursue discrimination claims effectively).
22. See Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 534 (2002) (“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be
especially solicitous of the self-help employee who opposes subtle discrimination, an often
nuanced, sophisticated and covert means of differentiating based on race.”); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465
(2001) (examining “the . . . role played by intermediaries in brokering the relationship between
judicial elaboration and workplace innovation”); cf. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend:
Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV.
931, 936 (2007) (“[I]n addition to the goal of permitting unfettered access to remedial
mechanisms, another goal of anti-retaliation provisions in employment discrimination statutes
should be to encourage workers to meet and discuss management-employee relations.”).
23. Sometimes, the EEOC decides to file a lawsuit on behalf of an employee or class of
employees, but in the vast majority of cases, it issues a right-to-sue letter and the employee is left
to pursue the claim without assistance.
24. See generally Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from
Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007) (considering the relationship
between federal antidiscrimination law and tort law).
25. See S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990).
26. See id. § 7.
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2000); see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)
(providing a two-year limitations period, extended to three years for willful violations); Fair
Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2000) (providing a two-year statute of
limitations).
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statute of limitations.28 In the absence of such a provision, the Supreme
Court has held that § 1981 race discrimination claims should be governed
by an analogous period under state law,29 and that the most analogous
limitations period is the one that governs residual or general personal injury
claims.30 Claims asserting personal rights, such as tort claims, typically
allow a two- to three-year limitations period.31
The effort to expand Title VII’s statute of limitations period in the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 was highly contested, with opponents
raising familiar concerns about “stale claims,” expanding employer
liability, and displacing Title VII’s ostensible goal of conciliation with a
more tort-like adversarial model.32 Supporters of the extension countered
that the statute’s unusually short limitations period failed to account for the
“substantial time” it takes for an individual to realize discrimination has
occurred, learn about the available remedies, and obtain the assistance of
counsel.33
After the 1990 bill was vetoed, its successor, the Civil Rights Act of
1991, was introduced almost immediately in the House.34 The bill also
included a two-year limitations period, again intended to bring Title VII
into alignment with a variety of federal civil rights laws with longer
limitations periods.35 As it had been in 1990, however, this provision was
contested, and the proposed extension was not included in the Senate bill
that ultimately was enacted into law.36
The failure of congressional efforts to expand the limitations period in
the 1991 Act closed the door on further reform efforts. Title VII’s
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
29. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987) (holding that § 1981
claims, for which there is no express statute of limitations, should be governed by an analogous
period under state law).
30. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–51 (1989) (holding that § 1983 claims should be
governed by New York’s three-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims
rather than the one-year limitations period reserved for intentional torts).
31. See, e.g., Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Connecticut’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations to § 1981 claim); Joanna L.
Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 BROOK.
L. REV. 329, 370 (2001) (“In many states . . . the statute of limitations under § 1981 is
considerably longer than that under Title VII.”).
32. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 63–64 (1990) (minority views of Sens. Hatch, Thurmond, and
Coats on S. 2104); H.R. REP. NO. 101-644(I), at 129–30 (1990) (minority views on H.R. 4000).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 101-644(I), at 36–38, 45–46.
34. H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1991) (introduced Jan. 3, 1991).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 63–64 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 601–
02.
36. See S. 1745, 102d Cong., 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 13,168,
13,230 (1991) (warning that “[p]assage of this legislation will mean an unending supply of
discrimination cases for trial lawyers throughout the country”).
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limitations period remains unusually short when compared to the vast
majority of other laws seeking to vindicate personal rights, and Congress
has not made any meaningful effort to expand it in the intervening
seventeen years.
B.

Triggering the Statute of Limitations: The Discrete Act Rule

Title VII’s short statute of limitations is exacerbated by strict rules
about how to define the “unlawful employment practice” that triggers the
limitations period. In 2002, the Supreme Court decided National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,37 in which it rejected the “continuing
violations” doctrine.38 Abner Morgan, a black electrician, sued his
employer, alleging a series of discriminatory acts—that he was paid
differently, punished unfairly, denied union representation in disciplinary
meetings, and harassed because of his race—between when he was hired in
1990 and fired in 1995.39 Amtrak won summary judgment on some claims
because they occurred more than 300 days before Morgan filed a complaint
with the EEOC and were therefore time-barred.40 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that under the continuing violations doctrine, which
permits a pattern of discrimination to form the basis for a lawsuit as long as
at least one act occurred within the limitations period, the time-barred
claims were “sufficiently related” to the timely ones.41 The continuing
violations doctrine, which was widely accepted by lower courts at the time,
reflected the recognition that discrimination develops and burdens its
victim over time and that it is often difficult to discern until an extended
pattern emerges.
The Supreme Court in Morgan rejected the continuing violations
doctrine, ruling instead that for discrimination that occurs in “discrete”
acts, such as hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer decisions, the
limitations period begins anew with the occurrence of each act of
discrimination.42 For such discrete acts of discrimination, and excepting
hostile environment harassment, which the Court treated specially,43
37. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
38. Id. at 114.
39. Id. at 105 n.1, 115 n.8. For a detailed description of the underlying facts, see Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 232 F.3d 1008, 1010–13 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
40. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
41. Morgan, 232 F.3d at 1015.
42. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
43. Id. The Court treated hostile environment harassment differently because, by its very
nature, it involves multiple incidents that occur over time. Id. at 104. The special rules for
challenging hostile environment harassment are discussed infra Part I.D. Notwithstanding these
special rules, however, some courts have held that discrete acts are still subject to the rule in
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employees must challenge each act within 180/300 days.44 Under this
framework, prior acts of discrimination are relevant only as background
evidence and are not themselves actionable.45
Morgan’s list of discrete discriminatory acts did not include pay
discrimination. However, federal appellate court rulings after Morgan
almost universally continued to apply the rule enunciated in Bazemore v.
Friday46 that each discriminatory paycheck issued within the limitations
period is actionable even if the pay discrimination first began long ago.47
In 2007, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,48 however, the
Supreme Court departed from this consensus and extended Morgan’s
discrete act rule to pay discrimination claims. In an opinion written by
Justice Samuel Alito, the Ledbetter majority held that an employee must
challenge pay discrimination within 180/300 days of the decision to pay her
a discriminatory wage, rejecting the longstanding position of the EEOC,
the agency charged with enforcing Title VII, that pay discrimination could
be challenged within 180/300 days of any paycheck containing a
discriminatory wage.49 The majority reasoned that a paycheck containing a
discriminatory amount of money is not a present violation, but merely the
present effect of a prior act of discrimination. “[C]urrent effects alone
cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination,” the Court
reasoned, and “such effects in themselves have ‘no present legal
consequences.’ ”50
Even after Ledbetter, the full scope of Morgan is still uncertain. Open
questions include whether the discrete act rule applies to pattern-andpractice cases (alleging systemic rather than individualized disparate

Morgan even if they are mixed in with allegations of a hostile environment. See, e.g., Pruitt v.
City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 2006); Sassé v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 2005 FED.
App. 0234P, ¶ 17 (6th Cir.), 409 F.3d 773, 783.
44. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122.
45. Cf. Ramirez Rodriguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 78 n.14
(2005) (permitting an ADEA plaintiff to introduce prior acts as background evidence).
46. 478 U.S. 385 (1986). For federal appellate decisions continuing to rely on Bazemore
after Morgan, see, for example, Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance Service, 409
F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005), and Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also
Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1020–22 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (describing the
pre-Morgan consensus applying the continuing violations doctrine to pay claims).
47. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., joined by all other Members of the Court,
concurring in part) (“Each week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly
situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII . . . .”).
48. 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
49. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2177 n.11 (refusing to extend Chevron deference to the EEOC’s
Compliance Manual or its adjudicatory decisions).
50. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977)).
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treatment),51 to acts of discrimination that occur after a timely filed EEOC
charge,52 to discrimination cases brought under § 1983,53 and to claims
brought under analogous state antidiscrimination laws.54
Morgan and Ledbetter together add to a body of law that erects
substantial roadblocks for plaintiffs attempting to claim antidiscrimination
rights. These decisions exacerbate the time pressures imposed on plaintiffs
by the Court’s prior rulings defining the acts that trigger the limitations
period to occur at the earliest possible moment. In a series of earlier
decisions, the Court established that the limitations period begins to run
when the decision to discriminate has been made and communicated to the
employee,55 even if the decision is implemented or its effects are felt at a
later date.56 A discriminatory decision denying tenure, for example,
51. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 n.9 (2002).
52. In Morgan’s wake, some courts have concluded that its reasoning requires application of
the discrete act rule to subsequent acts of discrimination. See, e.g., Wedow v. City of Kansas
City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2006); Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210–11
(10th Cir. 2003); Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 139, 148–49 (D.D.C. 2005).
53. Several federal appellate courts have applied Morgan’s discrete act rule to § 1983 cases.
See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of
Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.18 (7th Cir. 2003); Sharpe v. Cureton, 2003 FED App.
0050P, ¶ 33 (6th Cir.), 319 F.3d 259, 267–68; RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d
1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
54. Compare Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 527
(Iowa 1990) (permitting recovery for the entire period an employee’s rights have been violated if
at least one act of illegal discrimination occurred within the 180-day statutory period), with Rowe
v. Hussmann Corp., 381 F.3d 775, 780–81 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Morgan to claims brought
under the Missouri Human Rights Act).
55. Some courts have construed the Ricks standard even more broadly in favor of employers,
requiring only that the employee knew or should have known about the adverse action. See, e.g.,
Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994); Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d
1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987).
56. See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905–07 (1989) (finding plaintiffs
time-barred from challenging the discriminatory adoption of a facially neutral seniority system
where the decision to adopt the system was made outside the limitations period, even though the
system was first applied to plaintiffs, causing their demotion, within the limitations period); Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (running statute of limitations from the initial
decision to deny tenure rather than from the expiration of the plaintiff’s teaching contract or the
employer’s refusal to change the decision in its review processes); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 (1977) (ruling that airline’s failure to credit employee with seniority
when she was rehired following her prior dismissal under a discriminatory policy was merely a
“present effect to [its] past illegal act” for limitations purposes). Congress overturned the
Lorance decision with respect to seniority systems in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000) (defining an “unlawful employment practice” to occur “when the seniority
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person
aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system”). Although the legislative history
of the 1991 Act strongly suggests that the intent behind this provision was much broader, the
Ledbetter majority limited this provision to seniority systems, citing Lorance as good law for the
principle that discriminatory decisions, not their effects, trigger Title VII’s statute of limitations.
Compare 137 CONG. REC. 28,999, 29,047 (1991) (interpretive memo of Sen. Danforth) (“This
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triggers the statute of limitations, even if the employee continues teaching
and does not feel the effect of that decision until he is terminated much
later.57 By rejecting the continuing violations doctrine for discrete acts of
discrimination and defining discrete acts to include all individual disparate
treatment cases except hostile environment harassment, the Morgan and
Ledbetter decisions add to this time pressure. Together, this body of cases
sets the critical point in time as the original discriminatory decision, rather
than the timing of the discriminatory effects or the accumulation of
discriminatory harm.
Most importantly, neither Morgan nor Ledbetter accounts for the fact
that an employee may not realize that she has experienced discrimination in
time to protect her rights under these rulings. An employee may be unable
to recognize discrimination, and insufficiently motivated to act to challenge
it, until the effects of discrimination are felt and accumulated. For
example, if a female employee is denied a raise that her male colleagues
receive, she may not realize that a discrete adverse act has occurred at all.
Even if she is aware of an adverse employment decision, she may not
realize that it is attributable to discrimination. And even if she recognizes
that a discrete act occurred and was discriminatory, she may decide not to
complain until the pay disparity becomes significant for fear of adverse
consequences. Yet the Court’s doctrine assumes that employees possess
immediate and certain knowledge of the moment in time at which
discrimination occurs and are willing and able to take immediate action to
challenge it.
The realities of perceiving and reporting discrimination depart
dramatically from this idealized vision, however, such that the discrete act
rule has the effect of validating and perpetuating longstanding
discrimination. Under the Ledbetter ruling, for example, a woman could be
paid a discriminatory wage for her entire career as long as the initial
discriminatory decision went unchallenged for 180/300 days.58 As Justice

legislation should be interpreted as disapproving the extension of this decision rule [in Lorance]
to contexts outside of seniority systems.”), with Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. __, __, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2172–73, 2183 (2007) (relying in part on Lorance to bar pay
discrimination claim where discriminatory decision occurred outside the limitations period and
limiting the 1991 provision to seniority systems).
57. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 250–51; see also Ruiz-Sulsona v. Univ. of P.R., 334 F.3d 157,
160 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying same rule post-Morgan); Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d
964, 965 (8th Cir. 2000) (the initial denial of tenure triggered the limitations period, not the
plaintiff’s termination four years later).
58. The longstanding effects of pay discrimination are especially important given evidence
that gender often plays a role in the initial setting of an employee’s wage. See, e.g., Hannah Riley
Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Differences in the Propensity To Initiate Negotiations:
Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 95 (2007)
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Ginsburg lamented in her Ledbetter dissent, “[a]ny annual pay decision not
contested immediately . . . becomes grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond
the province of Title VII ever to repair.”59 The Court’s strict timely filing
rules are thus skewed to protect employers rather than to facilitate
employees’ asserting their rights.
C.

The Inadequacy of Tolling Doctrines and Discovery Rules

Together, Morgan and Ledbetter apply Title VII’s short statute of
limitations period strictly for most discrimination claimants, a hardship that
might be lessened in some cases by application of a robust tolling doctrine
and discovery rule. The Supreme Court, however, has been circumspect
about, and lower courts have divided over, the applicability of such
doctrines to the extent that they benefit plaintiffs.60
Because the limitations period under Title VII is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court, courts have the power to extend or
shorten it based on equitable considerations.61 Both employers and
employees are theoretically protected by such equitable considerations.
For employers, the doctrine of laches has been applied to place a limit on
the filing of claims to shorten an existing limitations period or to preclude
undue delay in filing a suit after the EEOC has evaluated the charge.62 This
doctrine protects the employer from any unfair prejudice caused by a
plaintiff (or the EEOC) sitting on her rights.63

(concluding, among other things, that women pay a “higher social cost for initiating
compensation negotiations than men”).
59. 550 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. See infra notes 65–86 and accompanying text.
61. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (noting the power of
courts to apply doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling to Title VII’s timely
filing requirements).
62. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (“[A]n
employer may raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from maintaining a suit if he
unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result harms the defendant.”). The defense of laches
is available upon proof of “(1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is
asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” Id. at 122 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977) (applying laches
to protect an employer who “might still be significantly handicapped in making his defense
because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action after exhausting its conciliation
efforts”); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (applying laches based on
delay of an individual party in pursuing her claim). For a more recent case applying laches to bar
the plaintiff’s claim, even though the statute of limitations had not yet run, see Smith v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 338 F.3d 730, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying defense of laches to bar
plaintiff’s Title VII claim where plaintiff unreasonably delayed in terminating state agency’s
claims process, which had lasted over eight years, to file with the EEOC).
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Statutory limitations periods can also be extended for the benefit of
employees by the doctrines of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. The
Supreme Court has said that equitable tolling principles apply under Title
VII, although it has cautioned that they should be “applied sparingly.”64
This admonition is itself telling, revealing a presumption that imperfect
knowledge of discrimination and justifiable delay in filing a charge are
aberrational and not the norm.
Lower courts have indeed followed the Court’s admonition to be
sparing in their application of these principles. Equitable estoppel can only
be raised when an employer actively prevents an employee from filing a
timely claim.65 Equitable tolling is a broader concept, which can be used to
toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff knows he has been injured
but “cannot obtain information necessary to decide whether the injury is
due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdoing by the defendant.”66 An
employer’s failure to post required EEOC notices, for example, can form
the basis for a claim of equitable tolling if the plaintiff did not otherwise
know he needed to file a claim with the EEOC.67 Courts tend to confuse
these two concepts and, in some cases, require evidence of employer
wrongdoing for either of them to apply.68 Courts generally refuse to toll the
limitations period based on the employee’s lack of information unless the
employer actively concealed relevant facts or actively misled the employee
into believing she did not have a claim.69 Even some kinds of clear
64. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; see also Baldwin City Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
152 (1984) (“Although absence of prejudice is a factor to be considered in determining whether
the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply once a factor that might justify such tolling is
identified, it is not an independent basis for invoking the doctrine and sanctioning deviations from
established procedures.”).
65. See, e.g., Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Equitable
estoppel focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from
filing suit . . . .”); Currier v. Radio Free Eur./Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1368 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“[A]n employer’s affirmatively misleading statements that a grievance will be resolved in
the employee’s favor can establish an equitable estoppel.”); Thelen v. Marc’s Big Boy Corp., 64
F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that equitable estoppel will operate as a bar to a statute of
limitations defense if “ ‘the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in
time,’ such as by hiding evidence or promising not to plead the statute of limitations” (quoting
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990)).
66. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990).
67. See Earnhardt v. Puerto Rico, 691 F.2d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 1982) (permitting the plaintiff to
invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling where the employer violated the EEOC posting
requirement and “the employee had no other actual or constructive knowledge of ADEA
complaint procedures”).
68. See, e.g., Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying
equitable “tolling” to case in which the defendant concealed the plaintiff’s cause of action).
69. See, e.g., Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1014–16 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to toll the
limitations period where employer did not actively conceal information or mislead plaintiffs);
Bennett v. Quark, Inc., 258 F.3d 1220, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Jackson v. Rockford
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wrongdoing by employers for the purpose of forestalling Title VII claims
do not toll the limitations period, such that a direct threat of retaliation has
been ruled not to toll the limitations period.70 And with respect to the
difficulties employees face in discerning discrimination, tolling doctrines
do very little to ease these problems.
Active concealment by employers, even if sufficient grounds for
tolling the limitations period, accounts for little of the problem in
perceiving discrimination,71 and employees who lack knowledge of their
injury or its discriminatory origin for other reasons are unprotected by
equitable tolling doctrines. To deal with the more common situation,
employees who have insufficient knowledge to recognize when they have
experienced discrimination, a more specific equitable rule—a discovery
rule—is necessary. Under the traditional formulation of the discovery rule,
a statute of limitations does not begin to run (because the cause of action
does not accrue) until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered she has been injured. The Supreme Court, however, has never
expressly declared that Title VII permits the application of a discovery rule;
in fact, it expressly declined to consider the question in both Morgan and
Ledbetter.72 Lower federal courts have split over the existence and scope
of a discovery rule under Title VII and related federal antidiscrimination
laws. The Fourth Circuit, for example, refused to apply a discovery rule to
toll the statute of limitations in Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank,73 a case
alleging an unlawful discharge under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”). The plaintiff learned only during the
discovery process on another claim that he was paid less than younger
employees in the same position.74 He then filed a pay discrimination claim,
Hous. Auth., 213 F.3d 389, 396–97 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Smith v. Am. President Lines, Ltd.,
571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978) (same).
70. See Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a threat of
retaliation as a basis for tolling the limitations period, and stating that, “[r]ather than deterring a
reasonable person from suing, it would increase her incentive to sue by giving her a second
claim”).
71. See infra Parts II.A.1–II.A.3.
72. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. __, __, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177
n.10 (2007) (“We have previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a
discovery rule. Because Ledbetter does not argue that such a rule would change the outcome in
her case, we have no occasion to address this issue.” (citation omitted)); Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 n.7 (2002) (“One issue that may arise in such circumstances
is whether the time begins to run when the injury occurs as opposed to when the injury
reasonably should have been discovered. But this case presents no occasion to resolve that
issue.”).
73. 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 2001 FED App. 0253P,
¶¶ 12–27 (6th Cir.), 259 F.3d 493, 498–502 (rejecting applicability of discovery rule to Title VII
claims).
74. Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 87.
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seventeen months after he had been discharged. The court upheld the
dismissal of the pay claim as time-barred because “the 180-day period for
filing claims begins to run from the time of the alleged discriminatory act”
regardless of when it was discovered by the plaintiff.75
Other federal appellate courts have acknowledged the existence of a
discovery rule in the context of federal antidiscrimination laws but have
construed it so narrowly that it rarely applies. The Seventh Circuit’s ruling
in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.76 is a good example. The plaintiff in
that case brought an age discrimination suit against his employer when,
after telling a manager at the company that he would not be retiring, he was
told he would be terminated.77 The plaintiff did not believe the manager
had the authority to fire him, but the termination was reaffirmed by his
direct supervisor in a meeting a few weeks later.78 His suit was filed within
the limitations period of the meeting with his actual supervisor but not of
the conversation with the manager who first promised to fire him.79 The
Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of a discovery rule but applied it
only to the time the “injury” was discovered—the original notice of
termination—rather than the later reaffirmation or the discovery of
evidence suggesting “discrimination.”80
The plaintiff’s injury was
discovered when the decision to fire him was communicated by the
manager, not when it later became clear that the decision was final or when
sufficient facts came to light to suggest discrimination.81
Likewise, in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,82 the Third
Circuit extended the limitations period only to include discovery of the
adverse employment action, not the discovery of facts suggesting the
employer’s discriminatory motive.83 In that case, a law firm fired a female
associate in April 1990 saying that it did not have enough work to sustain
75. Id. at 86.
76. 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 448–49.
78. Id. at 449.
79. Because of a state work-sharing agreement, the applicable limitations period was 300
days in this case instead of 180. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000).
80. Cada, 920 F.2d at 450. Although the Supreme Court has not acknowledged the
existence of a discovery rule, many courts find support for one in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), which held that the limitations period for
an allegedly discriminatory tenure denial began “at the time the tenure decision was made and
communicated” rather than from the date when the plaintiff’s employment contract actually
expired, id. at 258. According to the Seventh Circuit, the “discovery rule is implicit in the
holding of Ricks.” Cada, 920 F.2d at 450. Importantly, however, the Court’s phrasing in Ricks
suggests that it is the communication of the adverse decision, and not the discovery of facts
suggesting discrimination, that triggers the limitations period.
81. Cada, 920 F.2d at 452–53.
82. 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).
83. See id. at 1390–91.
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her position; she learned during an unemployment benefits hearing the
following year that the firm had hired a male attorney to replace her almost
immediately.84 The court held that the discovery rule delays the statute of
limitations only until plaintiff “has discovered, or by exercising reasonable
diligence, should have discovered (1) that he or she has been injured, and
(2) that this injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”85 In this
case, the notice of injury occurred on the day the plaintiff was discharged;
her later discovery of facts suggesting a discriminatory motive was
“irrelevant for the purposes of the discovery rule.”86 If courts continue to
set the critical time for purposes of the discovery as the date the employee
learned of the adverse action, and not when she learned sufficient facts to
suggest discrimination, a more widespread adoption of the discovery rule
will do very little to ease the burdens facing employees under Title VII’s
timely filing doctrines.
The minimalist discovery rules and tolling doctrines applied by lower
courts to date make the harshness of the Court’s timely filing precedents all
the more palpable for employees who fail to immediately recognize when
they experience discrimination.
Moreover, even a more generous
discovery rule would not help employees who are reluctant to immediately
challenge each discriminatory act when they first learn of it and are only
motivated to do so when they feel its accumulated effects. As a result, the
discovery rule and other equitable tolling rules will not solve the problems
plaintiffs confront in complying with Title VII’s short limitations period.

84. Id. at 1384.
85. Id. at 1386.
86. Id. at 1391; see also Ferrill v. City of Milwaukee, 295 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924 (E.D. Wis.
2003) (refusing to begin the limitations period for a black former police officer when he learned
that white officers had received less severe punishments for similar infractions: “[W]hen the
adverse employment action (i.e., the injury) was the termination of employment, the action
accrues when the plaintiff was advised of the termination, not later when he discovers facts
leading him to believe that he was the victim of discrimination.”). In the pay discrimination
context, the discovery rule has been held to toll the statute of limitations only until the employee
learns that a comparator earns a higher salary, regardless of whether she has reason to believe the
disparity is based on sex. See, e.g., Adams v. CBS Broad., Inc., 61 F. App’x 285, 287–88 (7th
Cir. 2003) (applying discovery rule when black female employee learned from coworkers a year
after starting employment that white male technicians were being paid more); Inglis v. Buena
Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025–26 (N.D. Iowa 2002). However, simply knowing of a
pay disparity with other workers is not enough to place an employee on notice that the disparity is
discriminatory. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure.
Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167,
178 (2004) (“Employees observe wage differentials without the full information necessary to
evaluate the justifications for the differing wages.”).
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Requirements for Reporting Harassment

Although Morgan carves out hostile environment claims from its strict
rule for challenging discrete discriminatory acts,87 even this more lenient
treatment is undermined by a judicially created affirmative defense to
employer liability for hostile environment harassment. In Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton88 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,89 the Supreme
Court established an affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual
harassment by a supervisor that does not inflict tangible harm. The
affirmative defense indirectly imposes a prompt complaint requirement on
harassed employees as a condition of preserving their right to enforce Title
VII’s substantive guarantees. Employers may avoid liability or damages if
they demonstrate both “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”90
The prompt complaint requirement comes from the second prong,
which focuses on how the employee responds to the harassment. Lower
courts interpreting the affirmative defense have taken a particularly antiplaintiff view of the second prong for determining whether a delay in filing
a complaint was excessive or whether the failure to file a complaint was
reasonable.91
87. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (“Hostile environment
claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.”).
88. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
89. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Despite the clarity of this test in
requiring proof of both prongs, some lower courts have effectively waived the second prong
where the first prong has been established. Under such rulings, an employer can establish the
affirmative defense to liability based solely on the reasonableness of its own actions, even if the
employee also behaved reasonably. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771
(8th Cir. 2004); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999); Watkins
v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *18–19 (4th Cir. Nov.
15, 1999). But see Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001)
(describing Indest as “highly suspect” and refusing to read out the second prong of the affirmative
defense). This development illustrates the extent to which lower courts have become hostile to
harassment plaintiffs, even to the point of ignoring clear Supreme Court language.
91. For an analysis of the pro-employer way in which the affirmative defense has been
applied in lower courts, see Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 722–29 (2000) (arguing that because reporting
harassment was “the least likely victim response,” the requirement of reporting to prove
“reasonableness” unfairly benefits defendants); L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable
Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 715 (2007) (“[L]ower courts
have applied [Faragher and Ellerth] in ways quite hostile to the interests of women who have
been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests of employers whose supervisory
employees have been accused of sexual harassment.”).
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According to lower federal courts, a “reasonable” employee who has
experienced workplace harassment must, at a minimum, file an internal
complaint that complies with the employer’s policies.92 If an employer’s
antiharassment policy has been made available to employees,93 courts have
found it unreasonable for employees to complain to the wrong person
under company policy,94 to go directly to the EEOC or a union
representative,95 to provide insufficient information for the employer to
conduct an investigation of the allegations,96 or to fail to cooperate with the
investigation.97
Only prompt complaints are deemed “reasonable,” a term courts tend
to construe strictly, effectively imposing a phantom deadline even shorter
than the statute of limitations. In one extreme case, a week’s delay was too
long,98 but even in more typical cases, courts expect almost immediate
action from harassment victims, especially for incidents of severe
harassment. The court in Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building
Services,99 for example, in a section of the opinion entitled “Employee’s
Unreasonableness,” found it unreasonable as a matter of law for the
plaintiff to wait seventeen days from the “first significant incident” to
complain.100
92. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 21–23 (2003) (noting that
courts have enforced a strict “duty to complain”).
93. Cf. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (depriving the employer of the opportunity to prove the
affirmative defense in part because it “had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual
harassment among [its] . . . employees”). See generally Grossman, supra note 92 (discussing the
legal ramifications for employers of failing to disseminate antiharassment policies).
94. See Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300–02 (11th Cir. 2000)
(finding that complaining to managers not designated by the policy is unreasonable for purposes
of the affirmative defense); Green v. Wills Group, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001)
(holding that complaining to the wrong person rendered victim’s behavior unreasonable).
95. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding
that electing to file a grievance with the EEOC rather than the employer constitutes an
unreasonable failure to take advantage of corrective opportunities).
96. See, e.g., Mernik v. Classic Cars, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-1327-P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9373, at *34–35 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2000) (finding plaintiff’s mention to employer of “crude and
vulgar” behavior was insufficient to constitute availment of the employer’s sexual harassment
procedures).
97. See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
failing to give honest answers to employer during investigation is unreasonable); McCluney v.
Cuomo, No. 3:99-CV-0668-BC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300, at *22–23 (N.D. Tex. July 5, 2000)
(finding that employee’s denial that harassment occurred in conversation with investigator was
unreasonable).
98. See Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998) (finding seven-day delay unreasonable).
99. 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
100. Id. at 1270; see also Walton v. Johnson & Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272, 1289–91 (11th Cir.
2003) (concluding that a three-month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law).
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Employees who experience harassment and then wait to see if
harassing behavior continues or to gather more evidence before
complaining are often deemed unreasonable,101 even though the EEOC’s
Compliance Manual states that an “employee might reasonably ignore a
small number of incidents, hoping that the harassment will stop without
resort to the complaint process.”102 The strictness of courts’ approach here
is particularly notable because, as explained later, employees might not be
protected from retaliation if they complain before marshalling sufficient
facts and ensuring a sufficient legal basis for their complaints.103
The failure to complain is almost always fatal to the plaintiff’s case,
since courts have been relatively unwilling to accept excuses and tend,
instead, to assume that such a failure is always “unreasonable.”104 A
“generalized fear of retaliation,” for example, is an insufficient justification
for not using an employer’s internal grievance procedure (despite the
frequency with which employees who complain actually experience
retaliation),105 and most fears are therefore rejected out of hand.106 In
dismissing such fears, courts tend to equate an employer’s formal policy

101. See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the “gravity and numerosity of the incidents” made it unreasonable for victim to
have waited to complain); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (finding failure to report for three months unreasonable even though there was a threemonth gap between the first incident and the next four, which happened in rapid succession).
102. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Comp. Man. (BNA) No. 915.002, at 17 (June 18, 1999),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (“An employee should not
necessarily be expected to complain to management immediately after the first or second incident
of relatively minor harassment.”).
103. See infra Part III.B.1.
104. As Camille Hébert points out, courts sometime read the reasonableness requirement out
of the second prong altogether, construing it instead to require complaints in all cases. See
Hébert, supra note 91, at 720. Other courts recite the unreasonableness requirement, but give
little, if any, consideration to whether a particular victim’s failure to report was, in fact,
unreasonable under the circumstances. See id.
105. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
106. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a]
generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment” (citation
omitted)); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that being “too
scared” is not a justification for failing to complain without evidence to substantiate such fears);
Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that “apprehension does
not eliminate the requirement that the employee report harassment”).
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against retaliation with the actual absence of retaliation,107 despite strong
evidence that the two bear little correlation.108
To justify failing to complain, employees must show specific credible
threats of retaliation or tangible evidence of the employer’s prior
unresponsiveness to harassment complaints.109 The court in Walton v.
Johnson & Johnson110 refused to excuse a three-month delay because the
harasser never told the plaintiff “her job was in jeopardy” or “threaten[ed]
her with physical harm.”111 The court failed to credit her fear of
complaining even though the supervisor’s alleged harassment had included
multiple episodes of “particularly traumatic” forcible rape and several
occasions on which he showed her his gun.112 Despite the rapes and the
gun-brandishing, the lack of a direct threat of retaliation reduced her
proffered excuse for failing to complain to “an unsupported subjective fear
that the employee would suffer physical harm at the hands of her alleged
harasser.”113 Even a harasser’s active efforts to deter a complaint are not
necessarily sufficient to excuse a victim’s failure to complain. In Wyatt v.
Hunt Plywood Co.,114 the plaintiff complained to her direct supervisor, one
of the individuals designated in the policy to receive complaints.115 After
107. See, e.g., Taylor v. CSX Transp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“Ms.
Taylor has failed to explain how she legitimately feared retaliation, particularly given that
CSXT’s antiharassment policy specifically forbid retaliation against employees who lodged
sexual harassment complaints.”); see also infra Part II.B.3.b. (discussing the actual role of
retaliation in employees’ experiences).
108. See infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text (citing data on retaliation); see also
Grossman, supra note 92, at 19–21 (citing data on antiharassment policies).
109. For cases requiring specific retaliation threats, see Leopold, 239 F.3d at 246 (“A credible
fear [of retaliation] must be based on more than the employee’s subjective belief. Evidence must
be produced to the effect that the employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints or has taken
adverse action against employees in response to such complaints.”); Anderson v. Deluxe Homes,
131 F. Supp. 2d 637, 651 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that warnings from other employees that
complaint would result in retaliatory firing might make plaintiff’s failure to complain reasonable).
For cases considering employers’ prior unresponsiveness, see Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son,
Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (noting that “a plaintiff may bring forward
evidence of prior unresponsive action by the company or management to actual complaints” as a
reason for not complaining); Childress v. PetsMart, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (W.D. Tex.
2000) (finding employee’s failure to complain unreasonable despite her testimony that she had
been told by coworkers “that complaining would be futile”). But see Burrell v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083–84 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding plaintiff’s failure to
complain due to supervisors’ participation in the harassment and their lack of appropriate
response to harassment committed by others was unreasonable when complaint procedures
provided for alternative means of reporting harassment).
110. 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
111. Id. at 1291.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1291 n.17.
114. 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 407.
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she complained, that supervisor joined in the harassment of the plaintiff—
“continually propositioning [her] for sex and making lewd comments”—
and warned her not to “go over his head.”116 The Fifth Circuit ruled that
the plaintiff behaved unreasonably by failing to complain to another
designee in the policy, and the supervisor’s admonitions did “not excuse
her failure to disclose harassment to a higher authority.”117
In general, these cases reflect a widespread refusal by courts to
consider context when making determinations about the reasonableness of
the plaintiff’s behavior. New employees are assumed to be as free to
complain as longstanding ones,118 employees are presumed to have
hindsight knowledge about a pattern of harassment that has only just
begun,119 and the fear employees report about retaliation is dismissed as
overly general and subjective. This acontextual approach essentially makes
the failure to complain immediately through employer-specified channels
per se “unreasonable,” effectively barring employees access to the law’s
substantive protections against harassment.
The emphasis in the affirmative defense on prompt complaints by
employees has spilled over into coworker harassment cases as well, even
though the Supreme Court has never extended the defense to these claims.
Unlike supervisory harassment, where the affirmative defense tempers the
baseline rule of vicarious liability, coworker harassment claims require
proof of a negligence-based justification for employer liability.120 Plaintiffs
challenging coworker harassment must show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment but failed to respond with prompt
and appropriate corrective action.121 Prior to the Court’s adoption of the
affirmative defense for supervisor harassment cases not involving tangible
harm, proof that the employer knew or should have known of coworker
harassment sufficed to establish employer liability, regardless of how the
employer learned of the harassment.122 In recent years, however, lower
courts have applied the affirmative defense to coworker harassment as well.
Plaintiffs have been penalized, for example, for not reporting coworker
116. Id. at 412–13.
117. Id. at 413; see also Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (D. Me.
2002) (refusing to excuse plaintiff’s failure to complain even though her harassing supervisor told
her not to tell anyone and warned her that his father was “good friends with the owner” of her
company).
118. See, e.g., Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (D. Nev. 2003) (concluding that
plaintiff behaved unreasonably for failing to complain because she “did not want to jeopardize
completing the probationary period successfully”).
119. See, e.g., Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(expecting plaintiff to complain even before realizing the misconduct would recur and escalate).
120. Grossman, supra note 91, at 689–90.
121. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (collecting cases).
122. Id.; Grossman, supra note 91, at 690 & n.94.
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harassment through employer channels, even when employer knowledge of
the harassment can be established in some other way.123 Thus, all hostile
environment claims effectively share a strict time limit on reporting
harassment, even shorter, in many cases, than the one imposed by the
statute of limitations.124
E.

Employer Internal Dispute Resolution Processes and Their Effect on
Formal Rights-Claiming

One of the most important developments in employment law in recent
years is the trend toward channeling employee complaints about
discrimination into internal dispute resolution (“IDR”) processes set up by
employers for addressing such concerns.125 Although the statute’s only
explicit administrative exhaustion requirement is to file with the EEOC or
state administrative agency before suing in court, the prevalence of
employer IDR processes effectively adds another layer of complaint
processing to Title VII’s formal rights-claiming regime. Increasingly,
courts and/or employers obligate, or at least strongly encourage, employees
to attempt to resolve their discrimination complaints internally before
taking official legal action.126
123. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 96 F.3d 1017, 1018–19 (7th Cir.
1996); Derringe v. Old Nat’l Bank, No. 3:04-cv-217-RLY-WGH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78669,
at *16–18 (D. Ind. Oct. 27, 2006). Reporting requirements are enforced indirectly, as well,
through the substantive elements of sexual harassment doctrine. For example, plaintiffs must
prove that the conduct they experienced was “unwelcome,” and the failure to promptly resist or
complain has been used as evidence of welcomeness. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepherd, 939 F.2d 484,
492 (7th Cir. 1991) (female police officer’s initial receptiveness to coworkers’ sexual
remarks/activities was fatal to her harassment claim).
124. Although the affirmative defense for supervisor harassment claims does not apply where
the plaintiff has experienced tangible harm, discrimination that results in tangible harm falls
under Morgan’s rule for challenging discrete acts. Thus, the doctrines coalesce to impose very
short time limits for challenging all forms of discrimination.
125. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2006) (“[M]anagement lawyers and consultants have frequently
urged employers to adopt internal dispute resolution procedures, zero-tolerance policies, and
diversity and sexual harassment training programs.”); Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of
Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 76–77 (2003) (“Judicial doctrine has encouraged employers to
develop internal dispute resolution and problem solving mechanisms. . . . Employers have
instituted a wide range of dispute resolution processes, including ombuds officers, mediation,
peer review, open door policies, and arbitration.”).
126. See, e.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 2003 FED App. 0388P, ¶ 5 (6th Cir.), 348 F.3d
537, 540 (after an employee filed an EEOC charge for racial harassment and discrimination, the
supervisor called a meeting “at which he threatened that it was inappropriate for employees to
take complaints outside of Crown Motors,” and stated that “all complaints regarding employment
should be made internally”(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lowry v. Regis Salons Corp., No.
1:05-cv-1970-WSD, 2006 WL 2583224, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006) (plaintiff was required to
sign an acknowledgement form when she was hired stating “that she ‘understood her obligation
as an employee to promptly report to the appropriate persons activities and/or conduct which may
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This kind of “privatization” of employment discrimination disputes is
driven by recent legal developments that make IDR policies and procedures
all but mandatory and integrally tied to Title VII’s liability scheme. One
important catalyst for this trend is the Supreme Court’s recent precedent,
discussed above, constructing an affirmative defense to supervisor sexual
harassment claims.127 The first part of the defense requires an employer to
show that it took reasonable preventive measures, generally construed to
require the development and distribution of policies and procedures for
resolving harassment complaints.128 The other part of the affirmative
defense, discussed in detail above, requires employees to act reasonably to
prevent and correct harassment, which courts generally interpret to require
employees to use such procedures.129 Partly in response to these incentives,
the privatization of harassment claims has become an entrenched part of
workplace culture.130
The trend does not stop with sexual harassment. Because racial
harassment is governed by the same liability framework, company
harassment policies generally encompass racial harassment as well.131 In
addition, other legal pressures create incentives for employers to develop
policies and procedures addressing all types of discrimination. For
example, even though there is no employer defense to liability for
discrimination involving tangible harm, employers can avoid punitive
damages by proof of good faith efforts to comply with the law.132 Thus,
there are strong incentives for employers to create policies and procedures
for addressing workplace discrimination generally. Any analysis of rightsclaiming under Title VII must take into account these developments.
Far from solving the problems created by Title VII’s prompt
complaint requirements, the added layer of internal processes creates
additional risks for employees. Employers broadly encourage employees
to use their IDR processes, and employer policies promising fair treatment
and zero tolerance for discrimination encourage employees to trust these
processes and hold high hopes for a positive outcome. If, however, the

constitute harassment’ ” (quoting Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is
No Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶ 7, Lowry, 2006 WL 2583224 (No. 1:05-cv-1970-WSD))).
127. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
128. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
129. See supra notes 87–124 and accompanying text.
130. See Grossman, supra note 92, at 3.
131. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25–26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(noting that Title VII standards for sexual harassment are the same as those for racial
harassment).
132. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
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results of IDR processes do not provide a satisfactory resolution,
employees may be worse off in their efforts to enforce Title VII rights.133
An employee who waits to file an EEOC charge while pursuing an
internal complaint process, for example, is likely to be out of luck. In an
early Title VII decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee’s
pursuit of an internal grievance process does not toll the limitations period
for filing a claim with the EEOC. In that case, International Union of
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,134 an employee initially
sought to resolve a discrimination concern internally, through the dispute
resolution processes established in a collective bargaining agreement.135 In
reasoning that is not limited to collective bargaining agreements and
applies to all IDR processes for investigating and resolving discrimination
complaints, the Court ruled that an employee’s participation in an internal
grievance process does not toll the limitations period for filing a Title VII
charge.136 The Court was concerned that tolling the formal limitations
period would discourage employers from attempting to voluntarily resolve
such disputes, and it viewed such processes as wholly distinct from Title
VII’s formal enforcement mechanisms.137
The Court’s reasoning cannot be squared with the past decade’s
proliferation of IDR processes for resolving discrimination complaints as
an integral part of Title VII’s legal framework. Courts’ continuing refusal
to toll Title VII’s limitations period for time spent trying to resolve
discrimination complaints internally seriously jeopardizes employees’
formal assertion of rights.138 Employers have a great deal of control over
the length of time such processes take, whether employees use them, and
the extent of employees’ reliance on and hopes for such processes. In this
environment, it is all too easy for such internal processes to run out the
clock on asserting rights through the formal statutory mechanisms.
*

*

*

133. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 125, at 28–31 (explaining and further developing critique of
employers’ internal dispute resolution process for discrimination complaints as skewed to serve
the needs of employers).
134. 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
135. Id. at 232–33.
136. Id. at 236–40.
137. Id. at 236–37.
138. See, e.g., Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that
the limitations period began to run “not when the grievance procedure to correct that decision was
terminated,” but when the initial decision to convert the pension system “was made and
communicated”); Jackson v. Carolinas Healthcare Sys., No. 3:06-CV-279-DCK, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89526, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (“Use of a company’s formal internal grievance
procedure does not toll the statute of limitations.”).
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Taken together, the body of doctrine discussed above places tough
requirements on employees to quickly ascertain and challenge any
discrimination they encounter in the workplace if they are to preserve their
Title VII rights. The law leaves very little allowance for difficulties
perceiving and recognizing discrimination, hesitation in reporting and
challenging it, and delay for the sake of pursuing other avenues first. The
law effectively reserves Title VII’s substantive rights to those employees
who are hypervigilant about noticing, comprehending, and challenging
violations of their rights. As the next section demonstrates, such an
employee is far from the norm.
II. THE REALITIES OF PERCEIVING AND CLAIMING DISCRIMINATION
The procedural framework for securing Title VII rights is strict by any
definition, but especially so when considered against the backdrop of
research about how people actually perceive and respond to workplace
discrimination. Unlike the worthy claimant the law assumes, real targets of
bias often do not immediately “know” when they have been discriminated
against, and even when they do perceive bias, they rarely challenge it
promptly, if at all. Legal doctrine predicated upon a false picture of
employee behavior undermines Title VII’s rights-claiming regime and
eviscerates the law’s substantive protections.
A.

Difficulties Perceiving Discrimination

Title VII’s short statute of limitations and strict timely filing doctrines
presume a legal subject who quickly perceives and recognizes unlawful
discrimination when it strikes her. At a deeper level, the strictness of Title
VII doctrine in weeding out potential claimants reflects judicial skepticism
of rights-claiming in this area and a fear of hypervigilant employees who
are too quick to infer discrimination. Such skepticism is shared widely in
popular culture, which has developed negative terms such as “feminazi”
and “playing the race card” to disparage women and people of color who
place too much emphasis on discrimination.
In reality, however, perceiving discrimination is more complicated.139
Evidence from the field of social psychology suggests that the
underperception of discrimination is more the norm than hypervigilance.140
139. This section summarizes social psychology research on perceiving discrimination
described in greater detail in Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the SocialPsychological Forces and Legal Narratives That Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 679 (2007).
140. See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected: Perceptions of Women Who
Confront Sexist Remarks, 45 SEX ROLES 567, 568–69 (2001) (summarizing research showing that
women tend to explain away sexism, despite evidence that it has occurred); Cheryl R. Kaiser &
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For example, even when women experience behavior that objectively
qualifies as sexual harassment, many do not perceive that they have been
sexually harassed.141 This example is part of a broader and widely
documented phenomenon whereby members of stigmatized groups
acknowledge that their group experiences discrimination but deny that they
have experienced it individually.142
As this phenomenon suggests, perceiving discrimination involves
complex social and psychological processes. Rather than encouraging
people to recognize discrimination quickly when they experience it,
numerous psychological processes interfere with the perception of
discrimination, especially when it occurs subtly rather than overtly.143

Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination,
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 803–06 (2006) (describing as “sparse,” the “empirical evidence
that members of historically disadvantaged groups claim discrimination when none exists, or
even that they are especially sensitive to and vigilant for discrimination,” and summarizing
studies supporting the view that people err on the side of denying discrimination); Brenda Major
& Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 285, 286–87 (Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (“[M]embers of disadvantaged groups typically miss, underestimate,
or deny the extent to which they are personally targets of prejudice.”); Charles Stangor et al.,
Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
69, 69 (2002) (“[P]rior research has shown that members of stigmatized groups are in many cases
unlikely to report that negative events that occur to them are due to discrimination, even when
this is a valid attribution for the event.”).
141. See, e.g., Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 390 (1999); see also Quinn, supra note 8, at 1156 (rejecting lack of legal
understanding as a sufficient explanation for women’s resistance to label their experiences sexual
harassment).
142. See John T. Jost, Negative Illusions: Conceptual Clarification and Psychological
Evidence Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 397, 404–05 (1995); Donald M.
Taylor et al., The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy: Perceiving My Group, but Not
Myself, To Be a Target for Discrimination, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 254–
55 (1990); see also Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, AM. BEHAV. SCI., Jan.–
Feb. 1984, at 371, 372–73 (1984) (describing bedrock study in this literature from 1978 in which
400 male and female workers rated their personal job satisfaction and grievances similarly,
despite objective evidence that the women in the study were discriminated against); James M.
Olson & Carolyn L. Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS
157, 163–64 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001) (explaining that the discrepancy holds true
for stigmatized groups generally and “crosses racial, gender, and economic boundaries,” and
noting that “it is a statistical impossibility for all members of a group to experience less
discrimination than other members”).
143. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination and Self-Esteem: Impact of
Group Identification and Situational Ambiguity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 220, 230
(2002) [hereinafter Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination] (“[A]mbiguous situations appear
to be especially difficult for members of stigmatized groups. Because they disguise prejudice,
they create uncertainty and interfere with the target’s ability to discount their own role in
producing negative outcomes.”); Brenda Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem:
A
Transactional Model, 14 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 77, 81–82 (2003) [hereinafter Major et al.,
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1. The Influence of Ideology
People have a widely shared desire to believe that the world is
fundamentally just in the sense that individual merit determines individual
outcomes, or in other words, people that “reap what they sow.”144
Perceiving oneself as a victim of discrimination conflicts with this world
view. In mainstream U.S. culture, beliefs in a just world are pervasive and
strongly influence perceptions of discrimination.145 This ideology is
especially influential in shaping perceptions of discrimination under
circumstances where discrimination is subtle and ambiguous, rather than
overt and clear cut, as is often the case.146
Women and persons of color who adhere to a belief in a “just world”
are less likely to attribute negative outcomes in their lives to discrimination
and more likely to internalize the reasons for disappointing outcomes
instead.147 For example, research on stigmatized social groups has found
that members of these groups who “endorsed the ideology of individual
mobility,” i.e., agreed with such statements as “[a]dvancement in American
society is possible for individuals of all ethnic groups,” were less likely to
interpret negative events as discriminatory than their cohorts who did not
adhere to these beliefs.148
The inhibiting effect of just world ideology on perceptions of
discrimination is particularly pronounced for members of disadvantaged
groups because it rationalizes and internalizes broader patterns of
disadvantage for members of these groups.149 In contrast, the belief in a
Prejudice and Self-Esteem] (stating that people are much less likely to perceive bias when
prejudice cues are subtle and not overt).
144. See, e.g., Olson & Hafer, supra note 142, at 159–63. Just world theory was originally
used to explain how people react to the suffering of others, but subsequent work has demonstrated
the theory’s force in explaining how people make sense of their own suffering. Id. at 159–60.
145. See Carolyn L. Hafer & James M. Olson, Beliefs in a Just World, Discontent, and
Assertive Actions by Working Women, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 30, 34–35
(1993) (explaining that people who hold strong beliefs in a just world tend to minimize
discrimination and blame themselves for poor outcomes); Kaiser & Major, supra note 140, at
806–08 (describing “the meritocratic worldview” and its prevalence in mainstream U.S. culture).
Particular workplaces in which the belief in meritocracy is especially strong may be especially
likely to discourage perceptions of bias against persons who do not rise to the top of the
organization. See id. at 810–12.
146. Olson & Hafer, supra note 142, at 163.
147. Id. at 161; Kaiser & Major, supra note 140, at 810–12 (discussing research finding that
low-status groups’ attributions to discrimination decrease when targets are first primed with
messages promoting a meritocratic worldview).
148. Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 143, at 82 (discussing research on
women and Latino/a Americans). The authors add: “They were also less likely to blame
discrimination when a higher-status confederate (European-American; man) rejected them for a
desirable role.” Id.
149. See Kaiser & Major, supra note 140, at 808 (“Because endorsing this meritocratic
worldview results in seeing low-status group members as deserving of their poor outcomes, the
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just world may have the opposite effect on members of privileged groups
by setting up an expectation of continued privilege that causes members of
these groups to suspect extrinsic and unfair considerations when they
experience negative outcomes.150
Blaming oneself, rather than discrimination, for disappointing life
events has the appeal of bolstering an individual’s sense of control and
avoiding the label of “victim.”151 For adherents to just world ideology,
victimhood is a stigmatized identity.152 The desire to see oneself as being
in control of one’s life helps explain the paradoxical finding that many
more people acknowledge widespread discrimination against their social
group than perceive discrimination against themselves individually.153
Blaming oneself rather than discrimination also enables people to
avoid assessing blame on others. People are reluctant to perceive
discrimination when doing so requires them to identify an individual
discriminator.154 The reluctance to blame others also helps explain why so
many people who recognize widespread discrimination against their social
group nevertheless deny that they have experienced it personally.
Perceiving discrimination directed at an individual requires an identifiable
villain, while recognizing systematic but anonymous discrimination does
not.

more low-status group members endorse these beliefs, the more they will minimize the extent to
which they face discrimination.”).
150. Id. at 808–09 (“[B]ecause endorsing the meritocratic worldview leaves members of highstatus groups feeling entitled to their privileged position, the more they endorse the worldview,
the more sensitive they will be toward perceiving signs of reverse discrimination.”); see also
Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 143, at 82 (suggesting that members of highstatus groups, such as white males, are more likely to attribute negative outcomes to
discrimination when they hold a belief in a just world).
151. Kaiser & Major, supra note 140, at 808 (discussing the psychological benefits of a
meritocratic worldview, including a sense of control over one’s destiny); see also KRISTIN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 109 (1988)
(“Injured persons reluctantly employ the label of discrimination because they shun the role of the
victim.”).
152. See Magley et al., supra note 141, at 392–93 (explaining that the ideology of individual
responsibility “turn[s] the word victim into a synonym for failure or irresponsibility”); see also
Quinn, supra note 8, at 1173 (explaining that complaining of sexual harassment saddles the
complainant with a “stigmatized” identity, and quoting one manager as stating that “making a
claim of sexual harassment is sort of like rape, it tends to reflect as badly on the person filing the
report as it does the person being accused” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. Olson & Hafer, supra note 142, at 164.
154. See Crosby, supra note 142, at 380–81; see also Jacquie D. Vorauer & Sandra M.
Kumhyr, Is This About You or Me? Self-Versus Other-Directed Judgments and Feelings in
Response to Intergroup Interaction, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 706, 715–16
(2001) (reporting results of a study in which a member of a racial minority who interacted with a
prejudiced white person felt badly after the interaction but attributed the negative feelings to
internal reasons rather than the other person’s prejudice).
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While these widely shared ideologies discourage the perception of
discrimination directed against individuals, other ideologies may encourage
attributions to discrimination. For example, a strong identification with
one’s social group tends to encourage the perception of discrimination
under conditions where prejudice cues are subtle or ambiguous.155 People
who strongly identify with members of their social group are more likely to
suspect discrimination in situations where bias takes a subtle form.156
As this research suggests, knowledge of discrimination is far more
complicated than Title VII’s timely filing regime assumes. Far from being
fixed and stable, it is mediated and filtered by an individual’s belief system.
Certain widely held belief systems encourage the denial of individualized
discrimination, particularly the belief in a just world, the ideology of
individual responsibility, and the reluctance to blame others.
2. Limited Information and Information-Processing Deficits
The likelihood of perceiving discrimination is highly dependent on the
information available.
Under ordinary circumstances, information
suggestive of discrimination trickles in piecemeal, in anecdotal fashion,
through the sharing of experiences with colleagues. Short of litigation and
the judicially supervised discovery process, employees very rarely have
access to aggregate data showing across-the-board treatment of employees
by race, gender, and other protected characteristics. With respect to
employee compensation, for example, organization-wide data broken down
by gender or race is generally unavailable.157 Although proposed
legislation, in the form of the Paycheck Fairness Act, would require
employers to make salary information more widely available, such
proposals have failed to become law.158
Aggregate data is extremely important in enabling people to recognize
individual instances of discrimination. Without data showing across-theboard disparities, people are more likely to hypothesize nondiscriminatory
155. See Brenda Major, From Social Inequality to Personal Entitlement: The Role of Social
Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership, 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 293, 331 (1994); Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 143, at 95.
156. Interestingly, identification with one’s social group had no effect on perception of
individually directed discrimination when conditions suggestive of prejudice were either blatant
or nonexistent. See Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination, supra note 143, at 228.
157. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 86, at 168, 171 (stating that social norms discourage
discussion of salaries in the workplace and observing that one-third of U.S. private-sector
employers have policies which, although illegal, bar employees from discussing their salaries,
while many others communicate an expectation of salary confidentiality).
158. See Kay Steiger, Less Money, Mo’ Problems, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 25, 2007,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=less_money_mo_problems. For the latest proposals
of the Paycheck Fairness Act, see Bill Summaries for H.R. 1338 and S. 766, http://thomas.
loc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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reasons for individual disparities and less likely to perceive
discrimination.159 With respect to pay disparities, for example, slight
variations in any of the criteria used for setting pay are likely to be
perceived as excusing gender gaps in pay, while data documenting
organization-wide disparities greatly increases the likelihood of perceiving
pay discrimination.160
The way information is presented and formatted also strongly
influences people’s ability to perceive discrimination.
Presenting
information on disparities in an aggregate, across-the-board format makes
it much more likely that people will perceive discrimination than showing
them the same information in case-by-case format.161 Apparently, the caseby-case formatting leads people to hypothesize neutral, nondiscriminatory
justifications, while the all-at-once, aggregate format makes such
speculation less likely.162
Both in terms of the information available and the way the available
information is likely to be presented, real-life conditions are much more
likely to obscure rather than encourage employees’ perceptions of
discrimination.
3. Within-Group Comparisons and Sense of Entitlement
A third influence on the likelihood of perceiving discrimination is an
individual sense of entitlement. In order to perceive that they have
experienced unfair discrimination, people must believe that they are
entitled to better treatment.163 A person’s sense of entitlement, in turn, is
shaped by the process of social comparison and consideration of the
treatment others receive, which provides information about what outcomes
are possible and deserved.164 Accordingly, the selection of comparators in
this process is critical in shaping perceptions of fairness.
In the process of developing a sense of entitlement through
comparison to others, the generalized tendency to draw comparisons within
159. See Crosby, supra note 142, at 377–78; Major, supra note 155, at 332 (“It is easier to see
discrimination on the collective level than on the individual level.”).
160. Crosby, supra note 142, at 377–78.
161. See Faye Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination: The
Importance of Format, 14 SEX ROLES 637, 644–46 (1986); Major et al., Prejudice and SelfEsteem, supra note 143, at 81.
162. Crosby et al., supra note 161, at 645.
163. See Major, supra note 155, at 293–94 (“[B]eliefs about entitlement are a critical
determinant of how members of social groups react affectively, evaluatively, and behaviorally to
their socially distributed outcomes . . . .”).
164. See id. at 298–300 (explaining that feelings of entitlement shape expectations and
perceptions of social justice, and that the process of social comparison is critical in shaping
people’s sense of entitlement).
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one’s social group has the effect of suppressing the likelihood that women
and people of color will perceive bias. For example, working women are
likely to compare their treatment with that of other working women due to
structural features of the workplace that highlight women’s similarity and
proximity to one another.165 Yet the very features of women’s lives that
create sufficient similarity to encourage within-gender comparisons—the
undervaluation of women’s work, vertical and horizontal job segregation,
and the disproportionate responsibility for caretaking and family
responsibilities—are likely to promote a lowered expectation of entitlement
by virtue of the comparison to other women.166 The use of same-gender
comparisons to evaluate the fairness of one’s pay, for example, leads
women to expect lower pay because women overall receive lower pay.167
Conversely, men compare their pay with that of other men, which leads
them to expect higher pay.168 In this way, the very existence of widespread
discrimination against one’s social group has the potential to suppress the
perception of discrimination against individuals within that social group.169
In a similar dynamic, a person’s current sense of entitlement is also
shaped by his or her past treatment. A person who is used to being paid
less is less likely to perceive lower pay as unfair or problematic.170
Consequently, prior discrimination can become self-reinforcing by
disguising the unfairness of present treatment through the lowered
expectations set by past treatment.171
Data on gender differences in pay expectations illustrates how such
processes suppress the likelihood that women will perceive pay
discrimination. In studies asking men and women to determine the amount
of compensation they would receive for performing specified tasks, women
paid themselves sixty-one percent of what men did.172 Similarly, when the
compensation was set first and subjects were told to work as long as they
165. See Olson & Hafer, supra note 142, at 166–67; Major, supra note 155, at 302–03, 314–
15.
166. Major, supra note 155, at 314–16. Vertical job segregation refers to the relative
representation of women and men in high-ranking positions within any job type. Horizontal job
segregation refers to the concentration of men or women in a particular job or category.
167. See id. at 320–21 (explaining that women’s default within-group comparison reference
point leads to lower expectations for pay than men have).
168. See id. at 321–22 (“Women and men estimate their personal deserving against a (same)
sex-stereotyped judgment standard. . . . Because women and people doing ‘women’s jobs’ are
typically paid less than men and people doing ‘men’s jobs,’ women estimate their personal
deserving and evaluate their outcomes against a lower reference standard for pay than do men.”).
169. See id. at 294.
170. See id. at 307–08, 321–22.
171. See id. at 303 (“[P]eople typically feel they deserve the same treatment or outcomes that
they have received in the past or that others like themselves receive.” (emphasis omitted)).
172. See Jost, supra note 142, at 404; see also Major, supra note 155, at 313–17.
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thought appropriate for that level of pay, the women worked one-third
longer than the men.173 Women’s suppressed sense of entitlement, strongly
influenced by the process of social comparison, plays an important role in
explaining the gap between the general recognition of discrimination
against women as a group and the tendency to deny individual experience
with discrimination.174
All of these processes greatly complicate the ability of employees to
quickly recognize when they have experienced discrimination. The failure
of Title VII law to engage these issues—most recently in the Ledbetter
decision—leaves employees greatly impaired in their ability to enforce
their substantive rights. With respect to pay discrimination in particular—
the subject of the Ledbetter ruling—this research suggests that employees
are highly unlikely to perceive pay discrimination in time to assert their
Title VII rights.175 More broadly, the difficulties identified in this literature
with respect to perceiving discrimination bode poorly for rights-claiming
with respect to discrimination claims generally.
B.

Difficulties Challenging Discrimination

In addition to the obstacles to perceiving discrimination, social
scientists have documented a host of barriers to challenging it. These
barriers are multifaceted, but we focus here on the well-established
reluctance of victims to file formal complaints in the harassment context
and the specific fear of retaliation that inhibits complaining about all forms
of discriminatory conduct.
1. Actual Versus Predicted Responses to Bias
Even individuals who accurately perceive that they have experienced
discrimination face additional obstacles to publicly confronting the
experience and reporting it. Social psychologists have observed a
significant gap between the ability to privately recognize an experience as
discriminatory and the ability or willingness to publicly label it as such.176
This gap defies expectations of most individuals about how they believe
they would react to discrimination in the workplace. In one study, for
173. See Jost, supra note 142, at 404–05.
174. See Major, supra note 155, at 295–96.
175. See id. at 325–26 (noting that even when people are aware that women receive less pay
than men, they tend to believe that differences in marketability, commitment to the workforce, job
responsibilities, job performance, and job qualifications, rather than discrimination, explain the
disparity, even when they do not).
176. See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective on
Confronting Sexism, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 168, 168 (2004); see also Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 26–31 (2005) (summarizing research on victims’ ability to
label discrimination).
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example, the vast majority of the female subjects predicted that when
confronted with three blatantly sexist comments by a male colleague, they
would challenge the colleague directly.177 Subjects in the same study,
however, did not in fact challenge the very same remarks when actually
subjected to them.178 Researchers concluded that women’s silence relative
to their anticipated responses reflected both the influence of social
constraints and the fear of negative judgments if they failed to acquiesce in
the harasser’s behavior.179 That women’s actual responses to bias are
significantly less confrontational than most of them predict has been
confirmed in other studies, including those designed to replicate
employment settings.180 In those studies, too, researchers found that
women’s nonconfrontational responses reflected an awareness of the
anticipated costs of complaining rather than an acceptance or approval of
the conduct.181 These studies depict a reality in which people fail to
confront discrimination publicly, and instead make strategic decisions
about when to confront, challenge, or ignore prejudice based primarily on
the anticipated consequences of their actions.182

177. Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?!: Women’s
Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 68–88
(1999).
178. Id. at 79. Although most women predicted they would confront the comments, id. at 81–
83, only forty-five percent confronted them at all and most of those did so using indirect
strategies such as asking the commentator to repeat himself or asking a rhetorical question, id. at
75–76. Only sixteen percent of the women directly challenged any of the remarks. Id. at 79.
179. Id. (reporting that, among the women who did not engage in confrontation, threequarters judged the commentator as prejudiced and ninety-one percent held negative views
toward him); see also Dodd et al., supra note 140, at 567, 569 (discussing women’s fears of how
others would perceive them if they confronted sexism).
180. See Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender
Harassment, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 15, 15 (2001). In this study, college-age women were asked to
predict how they would respond to three sexist questions in a job interview. Id. at 20–21. A
different group of subjects, also college-age women, were then placed in a simulated job
interview, allegedly to qualify for a research assistant position, and were asked the same three
sexist questions. Id. at 21–22.
181. While most women predicted they would feel angry if sexist remarks were made, in fact
they experienced fear as the predominant emotion. See id. at 25; cf. id. at 18 (explaining that
“targets of sexual harassment fear retaliation, reprisals, and even physical harm” and citing
literature interpreting sexual harassment as a manifestation of intimidation rather than sexuality).
182. Cf. Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and
Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002)
(“[O]ur results and others also show that reporting can harm the victim in terms of lowered job
satisfaction and greater psychological distress. Such results suggest that, at least in certain work
environments, the most ‘reasonable’ course of action for the victim is to avoid reporting.”
(citations omitted)).
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2. Employee Responses to Harassment
The best data about how employees actually respond to discrimination
comes in the sexual harassment context because only there does the law
officially require internal grievances as a prerequisite to vindicating
rights.183 Despite the law’s insistence on using employer grievance
procedures, however, sexual harassment victims tend not to utilize internal
complaint procedures or otherwise formally report incidents of harassing
behavior. Contrary to the law’s expectation that reasonable employees
report discrimination promptly and assertively,184 studies and surveys
reveal, quite to the contrary, that filing a complaint with an employer is the
least likely response to harassment.185 According to a 1995 study of federal
employees, only six percent of employees who had experienced sexual
harassment filed a formal complaint, while forty-four percent took no
action at all.186 The low reporting rate was striking given that the
employer-agencies all maintained written antiharassment policies,187 and
seventy-eight percent of survey respondents knew about the formal
complaint channels.188 A study of sexual harassment cases decided in the
two years following Faragher/Ellerth189 found that among women who
ultimately sued their employers for sexual harassment, only fifteen percent
reported the harassment to their employers in a timely manner.190 Other
surveys also reveal that employees who have experienced harassing
behavior report the incidents at strikingly low rates, from as low as three
percent in one study to no higher than twenty-four percent in others.191
183. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Grossman, supra note 91, at 722–23 (arguing that the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, which conditions an employee’s right to recover on her
prompt filing of a complaint, unfairly punishes employees who respond perfectly rationally to
sexual harassment).
184. See supra notes 98–124 and accompanying text (describing cases that assume
“reasonable” victims file complaints of discrimination promptly and assertively).
185. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 1154 (“Faced with harassing behavior, the least common
tactic appears to be direct confrontation.”).
186. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES 30 (1995) [hereinafter USMSPB 1995].
187. See id. at 40.
188. See id. at 33.
189. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
190. See David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800”
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2001).
191. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988) (finding that only
three percent of their sample had attempted to report a sexual harassment experience); see also
AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS
OF THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 17 (1992) (showing victim reporting rates of twenty-four
percent for enlisted women and twelve percent for female officers); DEP’T OF DEF., 1995 SEXUAL
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Employer surveys about the number of complaints they process confirm the
patterns of low reporting. Large employers, for example, receive an
average of six complaints per year, about two-tenths of one percent per 100
employees.192 Yet, harassment surveys covering the same time period
routinely find that four in ten women report having experienced harassing
behaviors in the previous two years.193 These numbers suggest a vast gap
between the occurrence of harassment and the willingness to report it. The
reporting rates do not vary dramatically across lines of race, culture, or
professional background.194 These rates have increased relatively little over
the past twenty-five years,195 despite the well-documented proliferation of
antiharassment policies and internal grievance procedures.196

HARASSMENT STUDY 19 (1996), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/docs/
r96_014.pdf (finding that twenty-four percent of active-duty military personnel who experienced
harassment reported it); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 71 (1985)
(describing a survey of workers in Los Angeles in which eighteen percent of women harassed
reported it to someone in authority); Jean W. Adams et al., Sexual Harassment of University
Students, 24 J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 484, 488–89 (1983) (finding that no student experiencing
sexual advances, propositions, or extortion reported the incident to university officials); James E.
Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 286–87 (1982) (showing a victim reporting rate of only seven
percent for harassed female automobile workers).
192. See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 5 (1999).
193. USMSPB 1995, supra note 186, at 13.
194. See, e.g., Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 693–94 (1997) (citing
research showing no relationship between women’s race and their responses to sexual
harassment); S. Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. Cortina, Coping in Context: Sociocultural Determinants
of Responses to Sexual Harassment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 394, 402 (2002)
(reporting the results of a study comparing responses to sexual harassment by professional
women in Turkey, professional and working-class Anglo-American women in the United States,
and professional and working-class Hispanic women in the United States, and finding that
“advocacy-seeking,” such as reporting, complaining, or speaking with management, was an
infrequent response by women to sexual harassment). Even women attorneys, a group one might
expect to be especially confident in asserting their rights, exhibit a reluctance to claim bias
publicly. See Lilia M. Cortina et al., What’s Gender Got To Do with It? Incivility in the Federal
Courts, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 259–60 (2002) (describing a study of female attorneys’
responses to incivility in legal practice, a phenomenon with a gender-based dimension); Cheryl R.
Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to
Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 255 (2001) (describing a study
of female attorneys’ responses to sex discrimination in the workplace).
195. Compare U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 71 (1981) [hereinafter USMSPB 1981] (documenting that three
percent of federally employed women victims reported harassment), with U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT.
BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 27 (1988) (showing a
five percent reporting rate), and USMSPB 1995, supra note 186, at 33 (documenting a six percent
reporting rate).
196. See Grossman, supra note 92, at 19–20 (describing nearly universal adoption of
antiharassment policies by employers in the last decade).
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Social scientists have shown that employees do respond to harassing
behavior, but not in the formal, assertive way that Title VII doctrine
requires. Most responses, particularly by women targeted for harassment,
tend to be informal and nonconfrontational.197 As with studies of broader
forms of discrimination, study participants considering hypothetical forms
of harassment tend to vastly overestimate the assertiveness with which they
would respond to real incidents of harassment. Laboratory studies
examining participants’ responses to various hypothetical scenarios show
that many participants believe they would be able to handle the situation
themselves. Fifty-three percent of respondents in one study indicated they
would “have a talk” with the harasser.198 Seventy-nine percent of
respondents in another study who had “received at least one sexual overture
from a man at work reported that they were confident they could handle
future overtures.”199 “[A]ctual victims,” researchers have found, “have
been shown to behave quite differently than research participants or the
general public say they would behave.”200
Early studies of how people respond to harassment rated participant
responses according to their degree of assertiveness and found, in general,
that actual victims of harassment tend to respond in relatively nonassertive
ways.201 They tend, for example, initially to ignore harassing behavior and,
if it continues, to respond with only mild retributions or deflections like
“I’m not your type.”202 They also rationalize harassment by blaming it on
197. See Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 136–41 (2001) (comparing Anita Hill’s response to
the responses of other women in sexual harassment studies); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply
to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 175–84 (2001)
(reviewing literature on victim response patterns). See generally Grossman, supra note 91, at
723–28 (reviewing literature on victim response).
198. Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations:
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 37 (1993)
(reviewing studies). For other studies examining hypothetical responses to harassment, see David
E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions to Sexual
Harassment, 10 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 12 (1989).
199. Gutek & Koss, supra note 198, at 37.
200. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, J. SOC.
ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 117, 119; see also Adams et al., supra note 191, at 489 (noting the
“marked contrast between what students think they would do and what students actually do when
confronted with [sexually harassing] behaviors”).
201. See, e.g., James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature
Review, 74 SOC. & SOC. RES. 3, 3–4 (1989); James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses
to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource
Models, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 814, 822–24 (1986); Gutek & Koss, supra note 198, at 37–38; Terpstra
& Baker, supra note 198, at 2.
202. Gutek & Koss, supra note 198, at 37.
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nonrecurring circumstances, such as a particular outfit, or treat it as a
joke.203 Women who experience harassment also elect to take quiet, but
personally costly actions to avoid the harasser, the job, or the situation,
over more confrontational steps.204
Other studies have methodically cataloged the many varied types of
responses to harassment, showing formal rights-claiming to be a leastfavored strategy. Fitzgerald, Swan, and Fischer developed a system for
classifying responses as either internally or externally focused.205 Common
internally focused responses include endurance (ignoring the harassment),
denial (pretending it is not happening), reattribution (“reinterpreting the
situation in such a way that it [is] not defined as harassment”), illusory
control (blaming oneself), and detachment (separation from harasser or
situation).206 Common externally focused responses include avoidance of
the harasser or situation, appeasement (putting off the harasser without
direct confrontation), and social support (talking to friends or coworkers
about the harassment), as well as more assertive responses like direct
confrontations with the harasser or formal complaints.207 Among the
myriad responses identified, the single most infrequent one, the authors
concluded, was “to seek institutional/organizational relief.”208 Victims turn
to formal rights-claiming only “when all other efforts have failed.”209
Finally, this literature suggests that men and women tend to respond
differently to harassing behavior, a difference that introduces a gender gap
into the gulf between the law’s “reasonable” harassment victims and real
ones. Women tend to engage in more passive responses to harassment than
men, and men are more likely to file formal reports or to seek the assistance
of lawyers in pursuing a claim.210 As Camille Hébert concluded in a recent
article, there is “substantial evidence that . . . women, because of their
differences from men in the manner in which they generally respond to
sexual harassment, are being disadvantaged by the courts’ definitions of
‘reasonableness’ with respect to those responses.”211 This finding suggests
that the burdens imposed by Title VII’s prompt complaint doctrines may be
especially onerous for women.

203. Id. at 37–38.
204. Id. at 38. These steps include quitting, seeking a transfer, and absenteeism—actions that
might alleviate the immediate problem of harassment but result in other costs to the victim.
205. Fitzgerald, Swan & Fischer, supra note 200, at 119.
206. Id. at 119–20.
207. Id. at 120–21.
208. Id. at 121 (emphasis omitted).
209. Id.
210. Hébert, supra note 91, at 730–31.
211. Id. at 730.
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3. Reasons for the Reluctance to Challenge Discrimination
The widespread failure to confront discrimination publicly—by
confronting the perpetrator, lodging an internal complaint, or filing an
EEOC charge—is driven largely by an accurate perception that the costs of
such responses will likely outweigh the benefits. At the outset, an
employee is unlikely to challenge discrimination if she believes that such a
challenge would be futile.212 Employee perceptions that challenging
discrimination is unlikely to yield any benefits are largely accurate.213
Even if an employee believes that there is some benefit to be gained from
challenging discrimination, she must still evaluate whether such a
challenge is worth the costs. As the following discussion shows, the costs
of pursuing discrimination claims are substantial.
a.

The Social Costs of Complaining

Social psychologists have documented a disturbing phenomenon in
which women and people of color who challenge discrimination are
disliked for doing so, even when their challenge is clearly meritorious.214
Such challengers tend to be perceived as hypersensitive and/or
troublemakers when they confront discrimination.215 A 2001 study found
that African Americans who blamed discrimination for a poor performance
rating on a test were viewed more negatively than African Americans who
blamed themselves.216 Regardless of the objective likelihood that the
student actually experienced discrimination, the predominantly white
212. See Childress v. PetsMart, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (employee
testified that she failed to complain about harassment because she had been told by coworkers
“that complaining would be futile”); cf. Quinn, supra note 8, at 1172 (“To use the law
instrumentally requires two acts of faith, so to speak. First, one must believe that change is
possible. Second, one must judge that the power for this change rests (at least partially) with the
law.”).
213. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 9, at 668 (“Those who do complain seldom succeed
within their own organization, before the EEOC, or in the courts.”); id. at 701 (“Most
[discrimination] plaintiffs who file federal suit never reach trial. If they do go to trial, they lose
more than 60% of the time. If they win, they get relatively modest awards.”).
214. See Brake, supra note 176, at 32–36 (summarizing research).
215. See Stangor et al., supra note 140, at 70 (summarizing research demonstrating the social
costs of reporting discrimination). See generally Faye J. Crosby, Why Complain?, J. SOC. ISSUES,
Spring 1993, at 169, 170–71 (discussing social norms that depict people who complain as
unattractive “whiners and malingerers,” while promoting the ideal of suffering uncomplainingly
as noble); DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 191, at 21 (finding that, among active-duty military
personnel who complained about harassment, twelve percent of women experienced hostility
from their supervisors and nine percent of women experienced hostility from their coworkers);
Kaiser & Miller, supra note 176, at 168, 175 (explaining their own work and citing other studies
about responses to discrimination, specifically confrontation).
216. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 194, at 261; see also Brake, supra note 139, at 699–704
(discussing this and related studies in greater detail).
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evaluators consistently rated an African American student more
negatively—as a complainer, a troublemaker, hypersensitive, emotional,
argumentative, and irritating—when he cited discrimination rather than his
own failings as the reason for the poor performance.217 A follow-up study
showed that other external attributions—blaming the test methodology, for
example—did not elicit the same negative reaction as the attribution to
discrimination.218 This study adds to a substantial body of work
establishing the significant social costs incurred by members of lowerstatus social groups who challenge discrimination.219 Such social penalties
are exacted even when there is persuasive evidence of actual
discrimination, such as direct evidence of an interviewer’s prejudice.220
Women also experience negative social reactions when they confront
sexism. As one recent study showed, the reaction to a woman who
challenges sexism is more likely to be hostility or amusement than guilt or
remorse.221 Another study revealed that women who confronted sexist
remarks were less well-liked by men than women who ignored the
remarks.222 These social penalties are part of a social dynamic of punishing
role transgressions that occur when a member of a stigmatized group
challenges the social hierarchy.223
Social penalties vary inversely with the complainant’s position of
privilege with respect to the discrimination in question. For example, in
the study just described of men’s and women’s reactions to a woman’s
response to sexism, researchers found that men had a greater inclination to
punish the woman’s transgression from prescribed gender roles, while

217. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 194, at 261.
218. Id. at 259, 261.
219. Id. at 255–56 (describing research documenting the high costs imposed on members of
stigmatized groups when they report discrimination); Knapp et al., supra note 194, at 711 (“[A]
very common negative reaction experienced by women who officially complain is public
humiliation.”).
220. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Interpersonal
Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL.
227, 235 (2003); see also id. at 228–29 (describing the implications of their own work and citing
other research demonstrating that African Americans anticipate social backlash if they confront
discrimination).
221. Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally):
Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 532, 541 (2003) (“[T]he predominant evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations
about gender-biased behavior was amusement.”).
222. Dodd et al., supra note 140, at 574–75.
223. Id. at 568–69 (explaining that when women challenge sexism, the “confrontation goes
against the more passive, ‘proper’ female gender role prescribed by society”); cf. Swim & Hyers,
supra note 177, at 69 (explaining that the dynamic of punishment in response to transgressing
gender roles contributes to the social constraints that suppress women’s confrontations of
sexism).
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other women tended to respond more favorably.224 Other research confirms
that social group membership has a marked influence on the way in which
individuals react to persons who claim discrimination. Women and African
Americans, for example, are more likely to claim discrimination privately,
anonymously, or in the presence of a member of their same social group,
and less likely to do so publicly or in the presence of men or white
persons—a reflection of their understanding that members of privileged
social groups are more likely to react hostilely to such claims.225 Finally,
members of low-power or stigmatized social groups suffer greater social
costs when they publicly challenge discrimination than do white persons or
men because their claims pose greater threats to the social order.226
The negative reactions to women and persons of color who complain
about discrimination go a long way toward explaining why so many
discrimination victims decline to confront or challenge discrimination.227
The widespread dislike of people who challenge discrimination also sets
the stage for understanding why retaliation frequently follows complaints
about discrimination and how fears of retaliation influence employees’
responses to discrimination.
b.

Retaliation

In addition to the social costs discrimination victims both fear and
face, employer retaliation occurs with enough regularity and severity to
support perceptions of the high costs of reporting discrimination and the
224. Dodd et. al, supra note 140, at 575.
225. See Stangor et al., supra note 140, at 73; see also Kaiser & Miller, supra note 176, at 168
(explaining research finding that women are reluctant to tell members of high-status groups that
they have been discriminated against); cf. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7–8 (1989) (describing
multiple consciousness and posing the hypothetical example of a woman of color who shapes her
responses in a first-year criminal law class on rape, depending on the race and gender of the
professor).
226. See, e.g., Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Why Minority Group Members
Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination That Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem
and Perceived Control, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 386 (1997) (explaining the
results of an earlier study in which male subjects did not minimize perceived discrimination but
were highly vigilant in perceiving discrimination against themselves); Stangor et al., supra note
140, at 72–73 (discussing the results of control groups using men and white persons as
discrimination claimants and showing little evidence of high social costs when men and white
persons attribute their own negative outcomes to discrimination).
227. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 182, at 230–42 (explaining that individuals decide
how to respond to perceived discrimination strategically, carefully weighing the predicted costs of
complaining); see also DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 191, at vi (finding that among female military
personnel who experienced harassment, twenty-five percent did not report their experience
because “they thought it would make their work situations unpleasant”; seventeen percent did not
complain because they would be labeled troublemakers; and twenty percent said they believed
nothing would be done in response to their complaint).
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rationality of deciding not to complain. One study of women who filed sex
discrimination complaints against their employer with the Wisconsin Equal
Rights Division showed that forty percent of the complainants reported
experiencing retaliation.228 Another study of state employees found that
sixty-two percent of those who reported sexual harassment experienced
retaliation.229 EEOC charge-filing statistics also reveal the depth of the
problem of retaliation—twenty-five percent of all charges filed under Title
VII include a claim of retaliation.230 The pervasiveness of retaliation in
response to discrimination claims cannot seriously be doubted.231
Moreover, ironically, given the law’s expectation of prompt and assertive
complaints of discrimination, studies universally find that formal
complaints of discrimination trigger worse outcomes than less assertive
responses.232 And in the harassment context, studies have shown that
228. Janet P. Near & Tamila C. Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process: Retaliation and
Perceived Effectiveness, 10 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3, 17 (1983).
229. Fitzgerald, Swan & Fischer, supra note 200, at 122–23 (describing the results of a study
of state employees finding that sixty-two percent of the women who reported sexual harassment
experienced retaliation, with the most assertive responses often triggering the harshest response);
see also DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 191, at 28 (finding that twenty percent of female military
personnel who complained about harassment reported experiencing “performance ratings that
were unfairly lowered” as a result). For a first-person narrative about a law professor’s
experience reporting harassment, see generally Anne Lawton, Between Scylla and Charybdis:
The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603 (2007).
230. See EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
231. See, e.g., Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling, Predicting the Decision to Confront or
Report Sexual Harassment, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 329, 334 (1998) (finding that
women who reported sexual harassment through formal organizational channels experienced
more negative outcomes than those who did nothing); Beiner, supra note 197, at 124–25
(“[M]any plaintiffs’ lawyers would tell you that once an employee complains about
discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that employment relationship over.”).
For a summary of other studies of retaliation, see Brake, supra note 176, at 32–42.
232. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 182, at 230 (describing the results of a study finding
that even in those situations where women believed that confronting the harassment “made things
better,” the empirical outcomes demonstrated the opposite); Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L.
Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with
Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 247–48 (1993) (finding that making a formal or informal complaint
produced worse outcomes than alternative responses, such as doing nothing, talking to the
harasser, or seeking social support); Fitzgerald, Swan & Fischer, supra note 200, at 123
(describing the results of another study finding that one-third of the persons who filed formal
harassment claims said that it “ ‘made things worse,’ ” and still another study finding that
“assertive [responses were] associated with more negative outcomes of every type,” even after
controlling for the severity of the harassment (quoting USMSPB 1981, supra note 195, at 71));
Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of
an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 896 (1997) (“Contrary to conventional
wisdom, assertive and formal responses were actually associated with more negative outcomes of
every sort.”); Quinn, supra note 8, at 1154 (concluding that failing to complain is not
unreasonable since “research has found that victims are often worse off after a direct complaint”
(citation omitted)).
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“women experienced increasingly negative consequences of sexual
harassment as their responses became more assertive, controlling for the
severity of harassment.”233
Retaliation functions not only to punish individuals who complain, but
also, perhaps more importantly for the success of a rights-claiming system,
to suppress future challenges to perceived discrimination.234 Research
clearly establishes that the decision of whether to challenge discrimination
turns on the careful weighing of the anticipated costs and benefits of doing
so.235 The failure to report or confront discrimination is a response to the
expected costs of doing so, rather than a determination that the event was
not discriminatory or harmful.236 The decision not to report is based largely
on employees’ fears of retaliation and other adverse consequences.237
233. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 1173.
234. Retaliation is perhaps the most important factor in suppressing challenges to
discrimination, but not the only one. Employees may face other consequences for complaining,
such as being sued by the alleged perpetrator for defamation. See, e.g., Paisey v. Vitale, 634 F.
Supp. 741, 745 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (refusing to enjoin defamation action against professor for
assertions made in affidavit charging discrimination); Herlihy v. Metro. Museum of Art, 633
N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that statutory provisions prohibiting retaliatory
conduct do not confer, upon bad faith complainants making false discriminatory-related charges,
absolute immunity from defamation actions that may arise out of those charges). But see EEOC
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F. Supp. 640, 644 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (concluding that a defamation
action may constitute illegal retaliation).
235. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 182, at 230–42 (discussing research on
whistleblowing generally, and sexual harassment specifically, and finding that persons engage in
cost-benefit analysis to decide how to respond to wrongdoing).
236. See, e.g., Kaiser & Miller, supra note 176, at 169 (“The most commonly documented
barrier to confronting discrimination is interpersonal costs, such as being perceived as a
troublemaker or experiencing retaliation.” (citation omitted)); Knapp et al., supra note 194, at
702–03 (identifying fear of retaliation or isolation and not wanting to be labeled a troublemaker
or victim as primary reasons for not reporting sexual harassment); Stangor et al., supra note 140,
at 73 (describing research showing that even when persons accurately perceive discrimination,
they often choose not to report it because of the social costs of doing so); Swim & Hyers, supra
note 177, at 68 (describing research on the influence of social context on confronting
discrimination and concluding that women who choose not to confront sexism act as “strategic
negotiators of threatening situations” (citation omitted)); cf. Crosby, supra note 215, at 174
(1993) (“It is . . . widely known that to speak out against injustice is to invite condemnation, and
this knowledge, added to the other disincentives, can be enough to assure at least temporary
silence.”).
237. See, e.g., Dodd et al., supra note 140, at 569 (explaining that fears of not being believed,
being retaliated against, being humiliated or of having one’s job negatively affected all contribute
to the reluctance of women to confront sexism); Fitzgerald, Swan & Fischer, supra note 200, at
127 (“Studies of victims consistently report that fear of personal or organizational retaliation is
the major constraint on assertive responding.”); Gutek & Koss, supra note 198, at 39 (explaining
that women rarely confront or report sexual harassment because they fear that it will not
accomplish anything and fear retaliation); see also Kaiser & Miller, supra note 176, at 169
(describing one study finding that women perceive confronting sexist remarks to be as equally
risky as responding with physical aggression against the perpetrator); id. at 175 (concluding that
fear of the consequences explains much of the gap between labeling a behavior as discrimination

BRAKEGROSSMAN.FPP

2008]

4/12/2008 11:18:38 AM

THE FAILURE OF TITLE VII

905

This literature demonstrates that full and secure protection from
retaliation is critical for the effectiveness of a rights-claiming system. The
absence of such protection only heightens the costs of complaining and
further suppresses the already pronounced reluctance to assert
discrimination claims. Unfortunately, the law’s treatment of employees
who do come forward with discrimination complaints provides little
reassurance to prospective claimants in their own cost-benefit analysis of
how to respond.
III. TITLE VII’S FAILURE TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES WHO ASSERT THEIR
RIGHTS
Title VII doctrine makes grand promises about the law’s protection
from retaliation in exchange for demanding that discrimination plaintiffs
promptly assert their rights. The cases are replete with expansive
proclamations of the law’s generous protection.238 Courts have even
pointed to the availability of retaliation claims to belittle employees’
excuses for not reporting discrimination.239 But, in reality, Title VII
provides only partial protection, even less so than a decade ago as a result
of recent doctrinal developments and workplace trends.
Title VII retaliation doctrine restricts protection to those claimants
deemed worthy of the law’s protections—those who are highly vigilant, not
easily deterred from asserting their rights, and fully informed of the factual
and legal predicates of the alleged discrimination before challenging it.
The gap between this ideal and the typical claimant marks the limits of the
law’s protection against retaliation as a mechanism for encouraging
discrimination claimants to come forward. Two recent developments in
retaliation law merit particular attention: the materially adverse standard
for retaliatory acts and the requirement that employee complaints of
discrimination rest on a reasonable belief in unlawful discrimination. Both
doctrines leave claimants woefully unprotected from the very retaliation

and confronting those responsible or reporting it to others); cf. Knapp et al., supra note 194, at
703 (observing that younger workers are more likely to make formal complaints than older
workers because younger workers have more positive expectations about the reporting process).
238. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. __, __, 126 S. Ct. 2405,
2407 (2006) (“[T]he anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering
[through retaliation] with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s
basic guarantees.”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (“[A] primary purpose
of antiretaliation provisions [is] [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 104–17; see also Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc.,
301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling that employer threat of retaliation does not excuse
failure to file a charge for purposes of tolling the limitations period).
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that stokes fears of complaining and deters prospective claimants from
challenging discrimination.
A.

The Materially Adverse Requirement

Until the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,240 lower courts struggled for years to set the
bar for determining what types of negative responses suffice to establish
unlawful retaliation. Some courts limited protection from retaliation to
those actions considered “materially adverse,” using fixed lists of
employment actions that qualified and those that did not.241 Other courts
eschewed a categorical list and inquired whether the particular action was
likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity under Title
VII.242 Still others were more strict, denying any protection from retaliation
that fell short of an “ultimate employment decision” such as a termination
or pay cut.243 This disparity in approaches recently prompted the Supreme
Court to clarify the level of severity required to establish unlawful
retaliation.
In Burlington Northern, a relatively easy case under any but the
strictest test, the Supreme Court considered the plight of a woman who was
reassigned from her job operating a forklift to more demanding manual
work and suspended without pay for thirty-seven days after she complained
of gender-based and sexual harassment.244 A divided appellate panel had
ruled that these actions were not materially adverse, but a unanimous en
banc court disagreed, with even the dissenting judges from the original
panel changing their minds after reargument.245
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court affirmed the en
banc decision and clarified the threshold of adversity necessary for a
retaliation claim. The Court rejected arguments by the employer and the
240. 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
241. These courts, like the Sixth Circuit in Burlington Northern, typically used the same
standard as Title VII’s substantive provision, § 703(e), which requires a materially adverse
change in the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2004 FED App. 0102P, ¶¶ 28–30, 35 (6th Cir.) (en banc), 364 F.3d 789, 797–
99, aff’d 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864–65
(4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1997).
242. See, e.g., Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Washington v.
Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,
1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000).
243. See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
244. Her pay was later reinstated for that thirty-seven-day period, but she testified that the
deprivation of pay during that time caused her financial and psychological hardship. Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2417–18.
245. Burlington Northern, 2004 FED App. 0102P, ¶¶ 1–2, 364 F.3d at 791.
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United States that the standard for a claim under Title VII’s provision
banning retaliation should be construed as strictly as the ban on
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.246 Instead, the
Court required that the challenged action be “materially adverse,” which it
defined to include employer actions that “well might have ‘dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’ ”247 In a confusing twist, the Court effectively adopted the
most lenient of the lower court standards but used the somewhat tougher
“materially adverse” terminology to describe it.
Early commentary on Burlington Northern construed it as generally
pro-plaintiff, since the Court rejected the strictest of the tests offered.248
However, an analysis of the first year of decisions in the wake of
Burlington Northern casts doubt on this initial reaction. The fairness of the
“objective” reasonableness standard turns on the assumed attributes and
behaviors of the hypothetical “reasonable” person. The Court’s somewhat
cryptic opinion contained hints as to its vision of such a person: a
relatively thick-skinned employee who is not easily deterred from taking an
assertive stand against discrimination.249 The Court concluded that the jury
could have reasonably found that the plaintiff’s thirty-seven-day
suspension without pay and reassignment to more arduous and “dirtier”
labor would likely deter a reasonable employee from complaining, but that

246. The two sections are structured differently. Section 703(a) ties the unlawful practices
covered to actions taken in the workplace. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). The retaliation provision is not so limited. See id.
§ 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.”).
247. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (emphasis added) (quoting
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
248. See, e.g., Scott Brutocao, The U.S. Supreme Court and Retaliation: Employees’ New
Favorite Weapon, 70 TEX. J. BUS. L. 422, 422 (2007) (predicting that Burlington Northern
“should make it even easier for employees to make a claim of retaliation”); Lisa M. Durham
Taylor, Adding Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard Fire: A Proposal for Congressional
Intervention After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 533, 533–34 (2007) (“While protection for whistleblowers is of utmost importance in
today’s workplace, the Court went too far in White, implementing a vague and highly subjective
standard that affords employees who complain of discrimination, whether founded or not, what in
practicality amounts to near immunity from even the slightest changes in working conditions.”);
Nicholas Villani, Note, A Bridge Too Far: The Supreme Court Overextends the Anti-Retaliation
Provision of Title VII, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 715, 738–43 (2007).
249. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
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“trivial harms,” “petty slights,” and “minor annoyances” would not.250 The
opinion suggests that “the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing,” and “ ‘snubbing’ by supervisors and
coworkers” fall on the trivial side of the line.251 Reasonable employees, in
other words, are resilient, self-sufficient, and willing to risk the loss of
congenial relationships at work in exchange for the assertion of civil rights.
To its credit, the Court did recognize that the reasonableness of
employee behavior should be evaluated from “the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.”252 Thus, the Court noted,
while a retaliatory schedule change may make little difference to some
employees, a young mother with school-age children might well be
deterred from complaining by such a schedule change.253 But this example
nevertheless reveals the Court’s default view of a reasonable employee as
one who, absent special circumstances, withstands social ostracism and
workplace annoyances and boldly asserts antidiscrimination rights, with
little regard for all but the most serious consequences.
Burlington Northern is still a relatively new decision, but early
indicators suggest that lower courts expect the reasonable employee to
endure a substantial degree of adversity for the sake of challenging
discrimination.254 Although the Court explicitly rejected a “tangible” harm
requirement for retaliation claims,255 a number of recent lower court
decisions have expressed skepticism that anything short of that would deter
reasonable employees from complaining. For example, in Higgins v.
Gonzales,256 the Eighth Circuit ruled that withholding mentoring or
supervision did not meet the standard without proof that the disparate
250. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. Eric Schnapper has observed that, even though the Court in
Burlington Northern clearly indicated that the question of whether employer conduct is materially
adverse is a question of fact for the jury, most lower courts continue to treat it as an issue of law
for the court to decide. See ERIC SCHNAPPER, BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE IN THE LOWER
COURTS:
AN
INTERIM
REPORT
4–5
(2007),
available
at
https://courses.law.washington.edu/schnapper/A556_Wi07/Documents/BurlingtonNorthernApril_
2007_1.pdf (reporting on case law in the first nine months after Burlington Northern). The
distinction is an important one. Of the cases not involving lost wages, courts that treated the issue
as a question of law found the retaliation to be lawful about eighty percent of the time, while
those that made it a question of fact virtually always found sufficient evidence to support a jury
determination of unlawful retaliation. Id. at 5.
251. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
252. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2416.
253. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
254. In the first nine months after Burlington Northern, “about half of the lower court
decisions reported in Westlaw have held that Title VII permitted the particular retaliatory actions
allegedly engaged in by the defendant employer.” SCHNAPPER, supra note 250, at 2.
255. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2413.
256. 481 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2007).
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treatment had an actual impact on the plaintiff’s employment situation.257
Even transfer to a lateral position in a different city would not suffice.258
The court instead dismissed the plaintiff’s concerns about having to start
over in a new job and move her family to a new school setting as “the
normal inconveniences associated with any transfer,” emphasizing the lack
of proof that her new duties were “more difficult, less desirable or less
prestigious.”259
Courts also have found negative job evaluations insufficiently adverse
absent proof of tangible harm. In Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.,260
the plaintiff allegedly received less favorable performance reviews after
complaining of race discrimination in a promotion decision.261 The
appellate court ruled that a lower performance evaluation might deter a
reasonable employee from complaining of discrimination because it could
affect promotion and earning potential, but remanded the case to determine
whether the lower evaluations had “actually impacted [the plaintiff’s]
wages or promotion potential.”262 Other courts simply presume that
negative job evaluations do not cause tangible harm, putting the burden on
plaintiffs to show that the negative evaluation would have dissuaded a
reasonable employee from complaining—a paradoxical quest given that the
plaintiff has complained in that very case.263
The post-Burlington Northern cases also pay little heed to individual
circumstances that might make certain employees especially sensitive to
particular adverse actions. For example, courts have found scheduling
decisions and job reassignments to fail the materially adverse standard,
without inquiring into the reasons such decisions mattered to the plaintiff.

257. Id. at 585–86, 590.
258. Id. at 590. The court in this case took issue with the plaintiff’s allegation of retaliatory
transfer since her original position was only for a fixed, two-year term, which had expired. Id. at
581 n.2, 583–84. However, the court opined that lateral transfer to another city still would not
have been adverse if her move had qualified as a “transfer” rather than a new hire because she did
not “allege the new position was qualitatively more difficult or less desirable than the one she
held in Rapid City.” Id. at 590.
259. Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
260. 2007 FED App. 0246N (6th Cir.), 221 F. App’x 424.
261. Id. ¶¶ 1–13, 221 F. App’x at 425–27.
262. Id. ¶ 39, 221 F. App’x at 433 (emphasis omitted) (reading Burlington Northern’s
discussion of the exclusion of an employee from a weekly training lunch as a materially adverse
act to mean that “markedly lower performance-evaluation scores that significantly impact an
employee’s wages or professional advancement are also materially adverse. The question is
whether that is the case here.”).
263. Kennedy v. Guthrie Pub. Schs., No. CIV-05-1440-F, 2007 WL 895145, at *7 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 22, 2007) (“[Plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate that the Superintendent’s letter would
have dissuaded a reasonable employee from pursuing his rights under Title VII—which is
precisely what [plaintiff] did in this case.”).
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In McGowan v. City of Eufala,264 the plaintiff’s request to transfer from the
night shift to the day shift was denied after she supported her coworker’s
discrimination charge.265 Because there were “no differences in pay and
benefits, nor was the night shift more arduous,” the court found that the
denial was not materially adverse.266 Contrary to Burlington Northern’s
sensitivity to how the plaintiff’s circumstances might bear on the hardship
of schedule changes, the court’s opinion did not discuss the plaintiff’s
particular circumstances or the reasons underlying her desire to switch to
the day shift.267 Instead, the court belittled the significance of the
scheduling decision, describing the plaintiff’s desire to switch to the day
shift as “purely for personal reasons” and “an undefined subjective
preference.”268 Likewise, in Reis v. Universal City Development Partners,
Ltd.,269 the court disregarded the employee’s particular circumstances in
evaluating the adversity of the retaliatory action.270 In that case, the court
ruled that the denial of the plaintiff’s request to transfer to a position where
she could work indoors to accommodate a congenital heart condition was
not materially adverse because it did not negatively impact the plaintiff’s
pay, opportunities for advancement, or prestige.271 The court did not
discuss the medical concerns prompting the transfer request.
While ignoring Burlington Northern’s call for context, these courts
follow Burlington Northern’s misstep by minimizing the importance of
social costs. The Court in Burlington Northern indicated that “snubbing”
and social ostracism would rarely deter a reasonable employee from
challenging discrimination.272 Citing this part of the Court’s opinion, lower
courts have rejected retaliation claims alleging social ostracism and
264. 472 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2006).
265. Id. at 739–40.
266. Id. at 742–43. The court also supported this result by noting that a witness testified that
the plaintiff possessed insufficient clerical skills to meet the requirements of the day shift and that
a similar request had been denied before the plaintiff supported her coworker’s claim. Id. at 743.
However, these facts, if true, go to the very different issue of causation, which is an independent
element of a retaliation claim.
267. Id. at 743; see also Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 590–91 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating
that the “normal inconveniences” associated with relocating and establishing new contacts at a
job are not alone sufficient to qualify as materially adverse actions, absent evidence that the new
job required more difficult or less desirable duties or was less prestigious).
268. McGowan, 472 F.3d at 743. And yet, as Professor Schnapper pointedly observed,
“[F]ederal judges would resign on [sic] mass if Congress required them to work on a night shift.”
SCHNAPPER, supra note 250, at 12.
269. 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
270. Id. at 1252–54.
271. Id. at 1253–54. Although the claim was brought under the Family Medical Leave Act
and the Florida Civil Rights Act, the court borrowed the Burlington Northern standard on the
issue of material adversity. Id. at 1252–53.
272. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. __, __, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415
(2006).
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harassment that do not result in tangible harm. For example, in McGowan,
the retaliatory harassment of the plaintiff’s son and his girlfriend was
deemed insufficiently adverse because it was not directed at the plaintiff
herself, thereby constructing the reasonable employee as someone who is
exclusively concerned with herself and her job, not the welfare of persons
close to her.273
Courts are dismissive of social ostracism even when it does target the
plaintiff, absent a showing of tangible harm. For example, in Halfacre, the
court ruled that ostracism by management would be sufficient only if
plaintiff could “establish that management’s conduct was more than
‘simple lack of good manners.’ ”274 Together, these decisions depict the
“reasonable” claimant as one who is thick-skinned, resilient, and
undeterred by “petty slights, minor irritations, or the simple lack of civility”
in pursuing nondiscrimination rights.275 They contrast starkly with the
social science research discussed in the prior section, demonstrating that
the fear of social ostracism does indeed deter people from challenging
discrimination.
Finally, although Burlington Northern did not address the issue of
whether Title VII protects the friends and family of a complainant from
retaliation, recent case law in the lower courts leaves gaping holes in Title
VII’s protection from retaliation on this score as well. Although there is
wide variation in how lower courts treat so-called “third-party retaliation,”
numerous courts have held that Title VII does not protect an employee
from retaliation based on her relationship to an employee who has engaged
in protected opposition to discrimination.276 Yet, employees who have
family members or other persons close to them working for the same
employer might well be deterred from challenging discrimination by the
273. McGowan, 472 F.3d at 743. The alleged harassment included citing them for having
unleashed dogs and serving them with arrest warrants based on this citation. Id. at 739.
274. Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 2007 FED App. 0246N, ¶ 39 n.1 (6th Cir.), 221 F.
App’x 424, 433 n.1 (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2415).
275. Sykes v. Pa. State Police, No. Civ.A.05-1349, 2007 WL 141064, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17,
2007).
276. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568–70 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing
to recognize retaliation claims raised by third parties); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d
813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Washco v. Fed. Express Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 547, 556 (E.D.
Pa. 2005) (same); see also Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226–27 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to grant spouse of employee who allegedly suffered age discrimination automatic standing to sue
for retaliation); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 546 (6th Cir. 1993) (permitting plaintiff to
sue for retaliation based on the opposition activity of a co-employee as long as there was a
“causal connection between the participation in protected activity and the adverse employment
action” (citation omitted)). See generally Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation
Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931 (2007)
(discussing and critiquing constraints on retaliation suits where the employer targeted a relative or
friend of the complaining employee for retribution).
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prospect of retaliation against such persons.277 It remains to be seen
whether Burlington Northern will make headway in closing this loophole
in retaliation law, but current case law is not promising.
The confident assertions by courts that certain actions would not deter
a reasonable employee from complaining are remarkable given that they
fail to cite any empirical evidence on how typical employees would
respond. Yet the assertion of unlikely deterrence is a distinctly empirical
claim. Stripped of empirical support, judicial claims about what actions are
likely to deter a reasonable employee from complaining mask normative
judgments about the level of adversity employees should tolerate in
exchange for the privilege of asserting Title VII rights.
Narrow as this vision of a worthy claimant is, it is further narrowed by
constraints on appropriate employee behavior at the opposite end of the
spectrum. While “unreasonably” thin-skinned employees are unprotected
from “trivial” adverse actions under the Burlington Northern standard,
employees who are too vigilant in pursuing their Title VII rights may
undercut their own retaliation claims. Through rights-claiming actions, a
plaintiff may inadvertently demonstrate that the adverse action of the
employer was not sufficient to deter further complaints. Sykes v.
Pennsylvania State Police,278 for example, held that a retaliatory action is
not materially adverse if the complainant continues to vigorously pursue
and supplement the discrimination charges.279 The plaintiff, a black female
police communications officer, received lower performance ratings in
response to her internal and EEOC complaints of race discrimination.280
Even if she proved causation, the court ruled, the retaliation was not
materially adverse because, “whether characterized as major or minor, [it]
did not deter [the plaintiff’s] pursuit of new and expanded allegations of
discrimination, either internally or administratively.”281 This reasoning
departs from Burlington Northern, which requires only that the action
would likely deter a reasonable employee from complaining—not that it
277. See, e.g., Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568–69 (acknowledging that the failure to protect
against third-party retaliation might deter employees from challenging discrimination); see also
Long, supra note 276, at 950 (“[A]ssociational retaliation would deter individuals who believe
they have been discriminated against from exercising their statutory rights, thus frustrating the
purpose of statutory anti-retaliation provisions.”).
278. No. Civ.A.05-1349, 2007 WL 141064 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2007).
279. Id. at *7 (“[The plaintiff’s] vigorous and repeated use of all available means to
supplement, expand, and pursue allegations of discrimination destroys the second element of her
prima facie retaliation claim. . . . [The plaintiff’s] own aggressive response to what she identified
as instances of discrimination belies any argument she might make that a reasonable person
confronted with the ‘adverse employment actions’ that she describes would have been dissuaded
from voicing additional allegations of discrimination.”).
280. Id. at *2–4.
281. Id. at *6.
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actually did—but if adopted more broadly, such reasoning potentially could
unravel the retaliation claim entirely.282
Not all of the post-Burlington Northern case law is so stringent; some
courts have given employees more leeway to challenge retaliatory actions
than earlier case law in the stricter circuits would have allowed.283
Nevertheless, as a whole, the post-Burlington Northern cases are
surprisingly tough on retaliation claimants, given that the decision was
widely heralded as a victory for employees soon after it was issued.284
The underlying difficulty with the “likely to deter” standard is the
mismatch between widely shared expectations about how employees
respond to discrimination and their actual responses. As explained above,
common assumptions that people are strident and vigilant in responding to
discrimination—assumptions reflected in Burlington Northern and the case
law it has spawned—turn out to be false. As a result, much employer
retaliatory behavior that is likely to actually deter employees from
complaining is left unregulated and fully lawful by recent interpretations of
this standard.
B.

The Reasonable Belief Doctrine

Retaliation law uses idealized images of discrimination claimants to
limit actual employees’ protection from retaliation in other ways as well.
Title VII retaliation doctrine posits a complainant who has solid evidentiary
support for believing that discrimination occurred and a near-perfect
understanding and acceptance of the limits of current discrimination law.
Employees who do not meet this ideal take a grave risk in challenging
perceived discrimination.
The source of these limits is the reasonable belief doctrine, an
understanding of which requires some background on Title VII’s retaliation
framework. Title VII divides retaliation claims into two camps, depending
on which of two statutory clauses apply: the participation clause or the
opposition clause. The participation clause covers employee participation
in Title VII’s statutorily authorized enforcement mechanisms, such as filing
282. See Mary Newman, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White: The Scope
of Retaliatory Actions and a Legal Catch-22, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 519, 519 (2007)
(observing that Sykes “seemed to turn the Burlington reasoning on its head”).
283. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2006); Kessler v.
Westchester County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209–10 (2d Cir. 2006).
284. See, e.g., E.J. Graff, Striking Back: The Supreme Court Recently Handed Workers a 9–0
Victory in a Pivotal Workplace Discrimination Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2006, at D1;
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Gives Employees Broader Protection Against Retaliation in
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 22; L.M. Sixel, Supreme Court: Ruling Widens Ability
To Sue; Decision Favors Workers, Defines Retaliation Broadly, HOUSTON CHRON., June 23,
2006, Business, at 1.
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a charge with the EEOC or a lawsuit in court.285 The opposition clause
covers a broader range of protected activity where Title VII’s formal
enforcement processes have not yet been invoked.286
The reasonable belief doctrine originally developed as an extension of
protection from retaliation in claims falling under the opposition clause.
While the participation clause broadly protects employees who participate
“in any manner” in Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms, seemingly
without regard to the merits of the charge, a strict and literal reading of the
opposition clause might limit protected activity to challenging only those
employment actions that are deemed actually unlawful. However, courts
recognized early on that employees must be given some leeway if they
mistakenly believe that their employer violated Title VII in order to provide
meaningful protection to persons who complain outside of Title VII’s
formal channels.287 At the same time, courts also recognized the
importance of providing protection from retaliation under the opposition
clause in order to encourage employees to seek to resolve such disputes
informally, before involving courts and the EEOC.288
Courts thus developed the reasonable belief doctrine to extend
protection to employees who informally challenge employer practices that
turn out to be lawful, so long as they had a reasonable, good faith belief
that the challenged conduct violated Title VII. Early cases emphasized the
predicament that would otherwise confront employees, given the difficulty
of determining, short of final adjudication, whether any particular employer
action actually violates Title VII.289
This rationale for the reasonable belief doctrine is sound.
Discrimination is a complex legal and social phenomenon, and potential
challengers cannot be certain in advance that the court that ultimately hears
their retaliation claim will agree with their assessment of unlawful
discrimination. Few potential challengers would be willing to take the risk
if their employer could punish them for complaining unless they could win
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (making it unlawful to discriminate against an employee
“because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).
286. Id. (making it unlawful to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”).
287. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th
Cir. 1981); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
288. See, e.g., Payne, 654 F.2d at 1139; Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019; Berg v. La Crosse Cooler
Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980); Hearth v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 436 F. Supp. 685,
688–89 (D. Minn. 1977).
289. See, e.g., Payne, 654 F.2d at 1139; Parker, 652 F.2d at 1019; Berg, 612 F.2d at 1045;
Sias, 588 F.2d at 695; EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga.
1975).
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a court case proving unlawful discrimination. As many commentators have
pointed out, employment discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to
win.290 Limiting protection from retaliation to only those employees able to
win a discrimination case would eviscerate Title VII’s protection from
retaliation.
Yet the reasonable belief doctrine has failed to honor its original
purpose—to protect the employee whose belief in unlawful discrimination
turns out to be mistaken. The turning point in derailing the reasonable
belief doctrine was the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County
School District v. Breeden.291 In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged that her
employer retaliated after she complained of an incident involving a
sexually charged verbal exchange between her supervisor and a
coworker.292 The incident involved a meeting between the plaintiff, her
supervisor, and a male coworker in which they were reviewing a personnel
file and came across a comment stating, “I hear making love to you is like
making love to the Grand Canyon.”293 One of the men read the comment
out loud and stated, “I don’t even know what that means.” The other man
replied, “I’ll tell you later,” and both men chuckled.294 The plaintiff later
complained to a supervisor that the incident made her feel uncomfortable,
and she was allegedly retaliated against in response.295 Evaluating this
claim under the opposition clause,296 the Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that the alleged retaliation was not covered by Title VII as a matter of law
because “[n]o reasonable person could have believed that the single
incident recounted above violated Title VII’s standard.”297
Although little-noticed at the time, Breeden established a significant
and troubling limitation on employees’ protection from retaliation. The
Court was correct that the facts before it would not constitute actionable
harassment, but the reasonable belief requirement it adopted sets up a
difficult dilemma for employees.
Though employees are widely
encouraged to promptly report all sexually offensive conduct through
specified employer channels, and indeed must do so to protect their later
right to sue for harassment, they are left vulnerable to retaliation if they
290. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2001).
291. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
292. Id. at 269.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 269–70.
296. As noted later in this section, the case also involved a claim under the participation
clause for retaliation that the plaintiff allegedly experienced after filing a charge based on this
incident with the EEOC. Id. at 271–74.
297. Id. at 271.
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report conduct that is not legally actionable. The Breeden case itself might
be dismissed as aberrational—bad facts making bad law—but it has served
as the catalyst for an increasingly strict approach to protection from
retaliation in the lower courts. The post-Breeden reasonable belief cases
are a sorry lot, strictly evaluating the reasonableness of the employee’s
belief both factually and legally.
1. The Factual Basis for Complaining
Courts require retaliation plaintiffs to show sufficient factual evidence
of underlying discrimination to enable a reasonable person to conclude that
discrimination occurred, a standard that comes perilously close to the
standard for surviving summary judgment on the underlying discrimination
claim. This requirement creates a dilemma for employees, who are
pressured to promptly assert their rights but are unprotected by retaliation
law if they challenge discrimination without first gathering facts to prove it.
A recent district court decision, Kennedy v. Guthrie Public Schools,298
highlights the tensions created by the Ledbetter ruling in particular. The
plaintiff in that case, the principal of an alternative high school for at-risk
students, was the only African American administrator employed by the
district.299 Based on a voluntary salary study, the district gave raises to
eleven of the district’s administrators, all of whom were white, but not to
ten other administrators, including the plaintiff.300 The plaintiff raised his
suspicion of race discrimination and allegedly experienced retaliation as a
result.301
The court ruled that the plaintiff’s perception of pay discrimination
was unreasonable, and that the school district had denied the plaintiff a
raise because its salary study had classified him as an assistant principal
due to the smaller size of his school.302 The court emphasized that no one
had told the plaintiff that the denial of a raise was racially motivated and
that the plaintiff could not point to any witnesses who could testify that

298. No. CIV-05-1440-F, 2007 WL 895145 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2007).
299. Id. at *1–3.
300. Id. at *1–2.
301. Id. at *2. As often occurs in retaliation cases, this case involved complicated issues of
causation, but the court’s reasonable belief ruling purports to stand apart from causation as an
independent basis for throwing out the claim. In addition to finding against the plaintiff on
reasonable belief and causation grounds, the court held that the allegedly retaliatory action, a
letter detailing steps the plaintiff must take to avoid being placed on administrative leave, did not
amount to a materially adverse action. Id. at *3, *6–7.
302. Id. at *5.
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race was the reason for the pay decision.303 The court also rejected the
argument that the decision to classify him as an assistant principal, rather
than a principal, was a pretext made “to obscure the fact that as a building
principal he was making less than the survey average.”304 The court
dismissed the retaliation claim with the same analysis it used to grant
summary judgment to the employer on the pay discrimination claim
itself.305
Other court decisions have been similarly strict in applying the
reasonable belief standard to the factual basis for the plaintiff’s belief. In
Bazemore v. Georgia Technology Authority,306 for example, the court
granted summary judgment to the defendant on a retaliation claim because
the plaintiff had insufficient proof of discrimination.307 The African
American plaintiff had complained of discrimination to his employer
because he was subjected to disciplinary action while a white female
coworker who engaged in similar conduct was not.308 The court explained,
“the record is devoid of evidence that a similarly situated white woman was
treated more favorably than Plaintiff,” and cited case law from that circuit
requiring “ ‘that the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be
nearly identical.’ ”309 It was not enough to show, as the plaintiff had, that a
similarly situated white comparator engaged in similar behavior and that
the plaintiff was punished while she was not. The court instead required
the plaintiff “to show that he and [the white employee] are similarly
situated ‘in all relevant respects,’ including [her] past performance and
disciplinary history.”310 The court gave no indication of how an employee
is expected to acquire such information, short of discovery. This case is
part of a broader trend in which courts apply the same standard for judging
the reasonableness of the employee’s belief in discrimination under the

303. Id. at *3. The court also noted that nine of the other administrators who were denied
raises were white and that the plaintiff remained the fifth highest paid administrator in the district.
Id. at *2–3.
304. Id. at *4–6.
305. Id. at *6 (“As discussed above, [plaintiff] has failed to offer any evidence that
[defendant] denied him a salary increase on the basis of his race. That dearth of evidence calls
into serious question the reasonableness of [plaintiff’s] belief that he was the subject of race
discrimination.”).
306. No. 1:05-cv-1850-WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL 917280 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007).
307. Id. at *1.
308. Id. at *2 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368–69 (11th Cir. 1999)).
309. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). As an alternative ruling, the court also supported its grant of
summary judgment on the ground that it was not reasonable to believe that the disciplinary action
in question amounted to an adverse employment action as a matter of law. Id. This part of the
ruling addresses the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s belief that discrimination occurred, and is
in line with cases discussed and criticized in Part III.B.2 below.
310. Id. at *4.
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retaliation claim as they apply to the merits of the underlying
discrimination claim itself.311
Courts also impose constraints on the kinds of evidence that can
support a reasonable belief that discrimination occurred.
The
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in discrimination is measured by
what the plaintiff herself experienced and her personal knowledge at the
time she complained, not by what she later learned herself or learned from
others secondhand.
For example, in Anduze v. Florida Atlantic
University,312 the court found insufficient evidence to support an
employee’s belief that discrimination occurred, discounting the affidavits
of two African American students at the college who alleged that the
plaintiff’s supervisor also treated them differently based on their race.313
Because a discriminatory motive is usually proven circumstantially, the
students’ reports could well have been relevant to the plaintiff’s belief that
her supervisor engaged in racially disparate treatment, even if such
evidence would not be admissible in a trial on the underlying
discrimination charge. The court’s refusal to consider the evidence
illustrates the predicament confronting employees who must immediately
challenge possible discrimination but are vulnerable to retaliation if they
lack the facts to prove it.
These cases leave employees who object to employer practices
without sufficient evidence to back up their concerns in jeopardy of
retaliation without legal recourse. When courts evaluate the reasonableness
of the plaintiff’s belief on a retaliation claim under the same strict standard
they use for deciding summary judgment on the discrimination claim
itself,314 the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in surviving summary judgment

311. See, e.g., Zappan v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 152 F. App’x 211, 218 (3d. Cir. 2005)
(finding an insufficient factual belief of discrimination because of the absence of evidence, apart
from the plaintiff’s subjective belief, that the disciplinary measures were taken for racial or
retaliatory motives); Kaplan v. City of Arlington, 184 F. Supp. 2d 553, 565 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
(finding plaintiff had an insufficient factual belief of religious discrimination because she offered
only “conclusory” statements about her supervisor’s intent).
312. 151 F. App’x 875 (11th Cir. 2005).
313. Id. at 879 (“The record reveals no evidence that she had suffered any change in her
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment at the time of her internal
grievances that would constitute an adverse employment action.”); see also Clover v. Total Sys.
Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (“For opposition clause purposes, the relevant
conduct does not include conduct that actually occurred . . . but was unknown to the person
claiming protection under the clause.”).
314. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 74–75 (1999); Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian
Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 271, 301 (discussing courts’ “chaotic” and “arbitrary” approach to whether to award
summary judgment to defendants in employment discrimination cases); Michael J. Zimmer,
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on discrimination claims bleeds into retaliation claims through the
reasonable belief doctrine.
2. Reasonable Beliefs About the Reach of Title VII Law
Perhaps the most problematic turn in the reasonable belief cases after
Breeden is the increasing stringency of courts in measuring the
reasonableness of employee beliefs in discrimination as a matter of law. In
addition to a reasonable factual basis, an employee who opposes
discrimination also must have a legally sound belief that Title VII was
violated in order to secure the law’s protection from retaliation. The
reasonableness of the employee’s belief is measured by existing law, and
courts charge employees with full knowledge of existing law—including
circuit-specific precedents—even if an employee had a good faith belief
that the law reached farther.315
Recent cases testing the legal sufficiency of employee beliefs in
discrimination unduly constrain the permissible interpretations of
discrimination law in order to label plaintiffs’ more expansive views
unreasonable. Courts’ use of the “unreasonableness” label squelches
constructive dialogue about the proper scope of nondiscrimination
requirements and grossly oversimplifies complex legal and social questions
about what “discrimination” the law does and should encompass. The
following discussion illustrates the problems this doctrine has created for
employees.316
Numerous court decisions oversimplify and even misstate the law to
find the plaintiff’s understanding of Title VII to be unreasonable,
notwithstanding specific actions taken by the employer to encourage that
very belief. In one case, for example, the plaintiff complained about
conduct that qualified as sexual harassment—a sexual assault by
coworkers—but she was left without recourse for the retaliation that
followed because she lacked a legally sufficient basis for holding the
Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 592–603 (2001)
(criticizing lower courts’ overuse of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases).
315. See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“[P]laintiffs may not stand on their ignorance of the substantive law to argue that their belief was
reasonable.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.
2000) (rejecting plaintiff’s retaliation claim for lack of reasonable belief; plaintiff’s complaint of
sexual orientation discrimination was not objectively reasonable because such discrimination is
not prohibited under Title VII); Clover, 176 F.3d at 1351 (in retaliation claim, measuring
plaintiff’s underlying claims of sexual harassment against “existing substantive law” and whether
conduct was “severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or
abusive”).
316. The discussion herein focuses on cases decided since January 2005. For a discussion
and critique of earlier reasonable belief cases, see generally Brake, supra note 176. The
reasonable belief case law has only gotten worse since that article was written.
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employer liable for the assault.317 The plaintiff was allegedly assaulted by
two male police officers with whom she went out for drinks after a late
shift.318 She claimed she was placed on light duty and eventually
terminated after she reported the assaults.319 Even though the facts were in
dispute both as to the assault and the retaliation, the court granted summary
judgment because the plaintiff could not show that the coworkers’ sexual
assault was endorsed or exacerbated by any conduct of the employer, a
prerequisite for employer liability for coworker sexual harassment under
Title VII.320
The court’s reasoning in that case is particularly egregious because the
Title VII standard for employer liability for coworker harassment requires
notice to the employer, followed by a failure to take appropriate action.321
Proof that the employer acquiesced in the coworkers’ assaults or responded
indifferently to the plaintiff’s complaint, for example, by requiring her to
continue to work with the two officers, could well have led to employer
liability for the failure to correct a hostile environment. The dilemma for
employees under the court’s ruling is stark. Caught in a chicken-and-egg
cycle, the plaintiff could receive no protection from retaliation for
complaining of coworker harassment without a prior basis for establishing
employer liability, but employer liability for coworker harassment may not
be established without first complaining about the harassment and waiting
for the employer’s response. To require a legal predicate for employer
liability before complaining about coworker harassment utterly defeats
Title VII’s substantive rights against sexual harassment.322
Another unforgiving court left a plaintiff unprotected from retaliation
for complaining about sexual favoritism in the workplace on the grounds
that no reasonable employee could believe that a supervisor’s favoritism
toward a paramour violated Title VII.323 The court charged the plaintiff
317. See Bicknell v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:03-CV-1045-T-27, 2006 WL 560167, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2006).
318. Id. at *1.
319. Id. at *3–4.
320. The court’s discussion of the liability question is cryptic, but it concludes that “a sexual
assault by a coworker does not constitute an employment practice proscribed by Title VII.” Id. at
*6.
321. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also Grossman, supra note 91, at 689–
90.
322. Another possibility, albeit one that the court did not discuss or appear to consider, might
be that the retaliation could itself create employer liability on a hostile environment claim for
coworker harassment by establishing that the employer failed to act promptly and appropriately
once on notice of the harassment. However, this would effectively require prevailing on the
merits of the discrimination claim in order to secure any recovery for the retaliation, something
retaliation doctrine purports not to require—and must not require, if Title VII’s protection from
retaliation is to be anything more than empty rhetoric.
323. See Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, L.L.C., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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with knowledge of Eleventh Circuit precedent on sexual favoritism
claims324 and deemed the plaintiff’s belief that sex discrimination had
occurred unreasonable because the plaintiff could not show that a male
manager would have been treated more favorably than she was.325
The court’s discussion, however, grossly oversimplified the state of
the law. In actuality, whether sexual favoritism in the workplace
constitutes discrimination under Title VII is a complicated question.326 The
court’s ruling in this case is particularly egregious because the plaintiff’s
belief that sexual favoritism is a form of sexual harassment was encouraged
and supported by the employer’s own policies, which prohibited
supervisor-subordinate consensual relationships, in part because of
concerns about sexual harassment liability.327 While the plaintiff claimed
that she relied on the company policy in formulating her belief that the
favoritism was a form of unlawful sexual harassment, the court measured
the reasonableness of her belief against its own view of current law and
disregarded the employer’s role in shaping the plaintiff’s belief.328
Plaintiffs have also lost retaliation claims where they opposed
harassment of persons other than employees, such as members of the public
or clients. These rulings also oversimplify complex questions about the
proper scope of Title VII and its coverage of hostile environment
harassment. For example, in Neely v. City of Broken Arrow,329 the court
ruled that it was not reasonable, as a matter of law, to believe that Title VII
bars firefighters from sexually harassing members of the public.330 The
plaintiff in that case, a deputy fire chief, had been notified that three
firefighters allegedly engaged in a pattern of sexually harassing conduct
324. Id. at 1370 (“The court measures the objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief
against existing substantive law and, accordingly, charges the plaintiff with substantive
knowledge of the law.”); id. (“[T]he unanimity with which the courts have declared favoritism of
a paramour to be gender-neutral belies the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s belief that such favoritism
created a hostile work environment.”).
325. Id. at 1371 (“[W]hen a supervisor gives favorable treatment to his paramour, every other
employee ‘with whom he is not having sex’ experiences the resultant discrimination or
harassment, regardless of their gender.” (quoting Complaint at 10, Sherk, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1358
(No. 3:04-CV-051))).
326. See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 421, 423 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing legal uncertainty over
the treatment of sexual favoritism); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 498–501 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the controversy over
whether sexual favoritism is a form of sexual harassment).
327. Sherk, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
328. Id. at 1372 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that her belief was reasonable given that the
employer’s handbook specifically linked sexual favoritism and sexual harassment “because
Plaintiff is charged with knowledge of the substantive law”).
329. No. 07-CV-0018-CVE-FHM, 2007 WL 1574762 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007).
330. Id. at *4.
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while on duty attending a training program in another town and while
driving a fire department vehicle to the training program.331 Even though
city officials strongly encouraged the plaintiff to conduct an investigation
into the allegations, “and informed plaintiff of their belief that a failure to
do so might expose the city to liability under Title VII,” the court ruled that
any resulting retaliation for the plaintiff’s investigation and discipline of
the firefighters was not protected under Title VII because a reasonable
employee would know that Title VII only protects employees from
discrimination.332
Once again, the limits of Title VII law are not so obvious or clear-cut
as the court suggests. One of the earliest hostile environment cases, Rogers
v. EEOC,333 cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,334 recognized that race discrimination against clients might
contribute to a racially hostile work environment for employees.335 In
addition to the Neely court’s overly simplistic view of Title VII law, its
reasoning can also be faulted for measuring the reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s belief exclusively against existing law, without regard to how the
employer’s own actions shaped the employee’s beliefs. Much like the
court’s decision in Sherk, the court here made no allowance for how the
employer’s statements influenced the plaintiff’s understanding of Title VII
law by raising the concern about potential Title VII liability from the
firefighters’ misconduct.336
Although many of the decisions rejecting the legal sufficiency of the
employee’s belief involve applications of harassment law, the standard
applies to other legal limits on discrimination as well. For example, in
Bazemore, the court ruled that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that
the challenged discrimination was unlawful because the alleged
discrimination did not, as a matter of law, amount to an adverse

331. Id. at *1.
332. Id. at *3 (“Harassment of members of the public, however vulgar and inappropriate, is
not covered by Title VII. . . . It follows that a retaliation claim based on opposition to or
investigation of a co-worker’s harassment of the public does not state a claim of action under
Title VII.”). The court did, however, allow leave for the plaintiff to amend his complaint in case
he could allege facts that might connect the firefighters’ harassment to discrimination against city
employees, such as “evidence that they recounted their exploits to fellow firefighters . . . in the
presence of female [city] Fire Department employees.” Id. at *4.
333. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
334. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
335. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 239; see also Brake, supra note 139, at 18, 94–98 (discussing and
criticizing other retaliation cases rejecting retaliation claims where the underlying conduct
opposed involved harassment of non-employees such as clients or members of the public).
336. Neely, 2007 WL 1574762, at *5 (“Mere statements that other persons told plaintiff that
the underlying conduct could subject the Fire Department to Title VII liability is not sufficient.”).
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employment action.337 In that case, the plaintiff had complained of
discrimination in the employer’s administration of a “Performance
Improvement Discussion,” an informal, critical evaluation.338 The court
ruled that because the criticism was not part of a formal disciplinary
process and did not result in a demotion, pay cut, or other tangible harm, it
did not constitute an adverse employment practice at the time the plaintiff
complained of it.339 The court’s cursory discussion of the requirements for
an adverse employment action obscures the complexity of debate on this
issue and the uncertainty surrounding the threshold required for an adverse
employment action under Title VII.340
Even in situations where the legal contours of discrimination law are
clear and not oversimplified by courts, it is still questionable whether
employees should be held to strict conformity with current law in opposing
what they believe to be discriminatory. For example, in Dinicola v.
Chertoff,341 an employee lost a retaliation claim where he had complained
about an employer’s refusal to consider him for a position because of his
age. Although the age discrimination in that case was undisputed, the
plaintiff was only thirty-seven years old, and the ADEA limits the
protected class to persons forty years of age and older. Accordingly, any
retaliation against the plaintiff for complaining was lawful because he did
not have a reasonable belief that the employer had violated the ADEA.342
Although this case is on stronger ground than those previously discussed,
because at least the legal limits were clear and the employer did not appear
to have encouraged the plaintiff’s mistaken understanding of the law, it still
places an unduly heavy burden on employees to thoroughly understand the
limitations of discrimination law before voicing a complaint, however
informally.
One of the more troubling developments since Breeden has been the
plethora of court decisions finding employees’ beliefs that they were
opposing unlawful harassment to be unreasonable because they complained
of harassment too soon, before enough incidents had occurred to create a

337. Bazemore v. Ga. Tech. Auth., No. 1:05-cv-1850-WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL 917280, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007).
338. Id.
339. Id. at *1–2, *3.
340. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 326, at 104–06 (discussing the controversy over what
counts as a materially adverse employment action under Title VII).
341. No. 05-CV-4968, 2007 WL 1456224 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007).
342. Id. at *6 (stating that “though it is clear that defendant engaged in the activity that
plaintiff first complained of, denying him an employment interview based solely on his age, it is
equally clear that this activity is not unlawful under the ADEA” because “plaintiff was not within
the class of individuals protected by the act”).
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hostile environment.343 These cases address employee challenges to both
racial harassment and sexual harassment and introduce an additional
complication for employees. In addition to oversimplifying the limits of
discrimination law and discounting the ways employers shape employee
understandings of discrimination, these decisions create a distinct dilemma
for employees who experience individual incidents of harassment. In
numerous recent decisions, plaintiffs have lost retaliation cases on the
ground that no reasonable employee could have believed that the
challenged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
actionable hostile environment.344 Such rulings leave employees in the
untenable position of having to promptly report acts of harassment through
employer channels in order to preserve their right to later challenge the
harassment under Title VII, yet risk lawful retaliation by employers if they
complain too soon, before the offending conduct comes close enough to an
actionable hostile environment. These doctrines converge to leave an
increasingly narrow space for employees to protect their rights to a
nondiscriminatory work environment. The following examples illustrate
how this doctrine punishes employees who speak up too soon against
workplace harassment.
One of the more notorious reasonable belief cases in recent years is
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.345
The plaintiff in that case was allegedly terminated for opposing what he
believed was racial harassment, and the court applied the reasonable belief
doctrine to uphold summary judgment for the employer.346 The conduct
precipitating the plaintiff’s underlying complaint occurred when a white
coworker in a company office was watching television coverage of the
capture of the D.C. snipers, two African American men, and exclaimed in
front of the plaintiff, an African American man, “ ‘They should put those
two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the apes
f--k them.’ ”347 When plaintiff, who was upset by the comment, discussed
the incident with two coworkers, they told him that this employee had
made similarly offensive remarks many times before.348 The plaintiff
complained through the appropriate channels under the company policy on
racial harassment and allegedly suffered retaliation as a result.349

343.
n.242.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

In addition to the more recent cases discussed here, see also Brake, supra note 139, at 88
See supra notes 298–311 and accompanying text.
458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2036 (2007).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
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Over a strong dissent by Judge King, the majority held that no
reasonable employee could believe that this isolated remark amounted to a
racially hostile environment in violation of Title VII.350 The majority cited
circuit court precedent for the principle that an isolated racist remark does
not amount to a hostile environment and emphasized the sine quo non of
actionable hostile environment as repeated and sustained conduct.351
Minimizing the severity of the remark, the majority characterized it as
“rhetorical,” not directed at the plaintiff, and prompted by an emotional
reaction to a major news event, “a far cry” from racist conditions so severe
as to alter the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.352 To the
allegation that the plaintiff’s coworkers told him that this same employee
had repeatedly made similar remarks in the past, the court responded that
plaintiff had not himself experienced such remarks in the four years he
worked there.353 The majority’s ruling puts the onus on employees to show
that “a plan was in motion” that would create an actionable hostile
environment, and that such a result was “likely to occur” before
complaining about conduct which, if it persisted, would create such an
environment.354
The court’s decision is particularly egregious because the employer’s
nondiscrimination policy required employees to report any racial
harassment to a supervisor, which the plaintiff did.355 The majority
responded to the plaintiff’s arguments about the resulting double-bind
facetiously, insisting that there is no double-bind if the harassment is close
enough to an unlawful hostile environment to meet the reasonable belief
test and attributing whatever hardship resulted from its ruling to Congress’s
judgment and not the court’s.356
Like many of the reasonable belief decisions, the majority’s reasoning
overstates the clarity of harassment law by citing conservative decisions
that support its result, without engaging reasonable arguments for setting a
different threshold for severity and pervasiveness. Judge King’s dissent
masterfully exposes the extreme and threatening racism in the offending
350. Id. at 340–44.
351. Id. at 339–40.
352. Id. at 340–41.
353. Id. at 341.
354. Id. at 340–41.
355. Id. at 347.
356. Id. at 341–43. For other critiques of these cases and the weakening of Title VII’s
opposition clause, see generally Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting ‘Reasonableness’: A New Look at
Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1469 (2007); Lawrence D.
Rosenthal, To Report or Not To Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable
Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, ARIZ. ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983781.
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comment and vividly describes the resulting Catch-22 for employees, who
are required to report such conduct under employer policies, and must do
so to preserve their Title VII rights to challenge such harassment, yet are
left vulnerable to retaliation when they do.357 The harshness of the court’s
decision contrasts sharply with the majority’s rhetoric promising generous
protection from retaliation under Title VII.358
The Jordan decision is one of several recent cases in which employees
report racial harassment through employer-directed channels, allegedly
experience retaliation in response, and are left with no legal recourse
because the racially offensive conduct they reported was not severe or
pervasive enough to support a reasonable belief that the company violated
Title VII.359 The resulting predicament is devastating for Title VII’s
effectiveness as a mechanism for addressing racial harassment.
Cases applying the reasonable belief test to employees who challenge
sexually harassing conduct create a similar dilemma. In Lowry v. Regis
Salons Corp.,360 for example, the plaintiff claimed that she experienced
retaliation for complaining to her employer of sexually offensive behavior
by a coworker.361 In the incident in question, a coworker asked the plaintiff
to go with him to a back room for the ostensible purpose of showing her a

357. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 350–51 (King, J., dissenting) (explaining how the comment
“play[ed] on historic, bigoted stereotypes that have characterized [African Americans] as
uncivilized, non-human creatures who are intellectually and culturally inferior to whites,” and
that the comment is “acutely insulting” and threatening to African Americans in a way “our panel
is scarcely qualified to comprehend”); id. at 352–53 (“[I]ts decision has placed employees like
Jordan in an untenable position, requiring them to report racially hostile conduct, but leaving
them entirely at the employer’s mercy when they do so”; citing Fourth Circuit precedent
interpreting the affirmative defense to require employees to promptly report harassment rather
than wait to investigate and gather evidence).
358. Id. at 338–39 (majority opinion) (characterizing the circuit’s reasonable belief precedent
as “[r]eading the language generously to give effect to its purpose,” rather than limiting protection
to complaints of actually unlawful discrimination); id. at 343 (“Congress limited the scope of
retaliation claims, and [Fourth Circuit precedent] amply, indeed generously, protects employees
who reasonably err in understanding those limits.”).
359. See Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2007)
(plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that supervisor’s “racially inappropriate” reference to “ghetto
children” was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII); Carlisle v. Sallie Mae, Inc.,
No. 5:05cv188/MCR/EMT, 2007 WL 141138, at *3, *9 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2007) (plaintiff lacked
a reasonable belief that four incidents involving racially derogatory comments, including
supervisors’ reference to Martin Luther King day as “spook day,” was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to violate Title VII); Wilson v. Dep’t of Children and Families, No.
302CV357J32MMH., 2006 WL 66723, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s
retaliation claim for lack of reasonable belief and stating, “[n]or is the allegation, which we must
accept as true for summary judgment purposes, that Day made a single racially derogatory remark
a basis for bringing a charge of discrimination”).
360. No. 1:05-cv-1970-WSD, 2006 WL 2583224 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006).
361. Id. at *1–2.
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rash on his leg.362 When she did, instead of lifting his pant leg as she had
expected, he unfastened his pants and dropped them to floor, revealing red
bikini underwear that left part of his genitals exposed, and he “had his
hands on his hips and was moving them toward his waistline and genital
area.”363 The plaintiff quickly left the room.364 Plaintiff complained to a
store manager about the incident, and in her retaliation claim, alleged that
she was fired as a result.365
The court granted summary judgment to the employer, ruling that the
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the one incident in
question created an unlawful hostile environment.366 Measuring the
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief under the existing law of the circuit,
the court ruled that the underlying incident was not severe or pervasive
enough to support a reasonable belief that it was unlawful because it did
not make the plaintiff feel “intimidated, threatened, or humiliated,” but
only uncomfortable, and it did not affect her job performance.367 The court
summed up the gap between the plaintiff’s understanding and existing law
as follows:
[A]s a matter of law in this Circuit, a single incident of stripping
down to one’s underwear in front of an employee, for the purpose of
showing a rash on the leg, absent a showing of additional gender
related harassment, does not constitute sexual harassment when
judged by existing substantive law.368
Like many of the reasonable belief decisions, the court’s ruling made
no allowance for how employer policies and pronouncements shape the
reasonableness of an employee’s belief about how she should respond to
sexually offensive behavior. When the plaintiff was hired, she was
required to sign an acknowledgement form stating that she had received,
read, and understood the employer’s sexual harassment policy, and “that
she ‘understood her obligation as an employee to promptly report to the
362. Id. at *4.
363. Id.
364. Id. Soon after this incident, the same coworker remarked to the plaintiff, “in front of a
client, that she had seen him ‘in the buff.’ ” Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶ 11, Lowry,
2006 WL 2583224 (No. 1:05-cv-1970-WSD))
365. Id. at *5, *9.
366. Id. at *11. The court also faulted the plaintiff for inadequate proof of causation, an
independent requirement for succeeding on a retaliation claim. Id. at *16–17. Our criticism is
limited to the court’s application of the reasonable belief doctrine.
367. Id. at *11 (“Under the law of this Circuit, the conduct of which Plaintiff complained was
not severe or pervasive enough to have interfered with her job performance, so that it could
constitute, or reasonably be believed to constitute, unlawful behavior under Title VII.”).
368. Id. at *12.
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appropriate persons activities and/or conduct which may constitute
harassment.’ ”369 The court’s decision leaves employees with little margin
for error if they follow employer instructions to report behavior they
understand to be harassment but cannot later convince a court, in the event
of employer retaliation, that this belief was reasonable as measured by
existing law. Like the cases involving challenges to racial harassment,
Breeden has prompted a trend of lower court decisions deeming employees
unreasonable for challenging perceived sexual harassment without a
sufficient quantity of conduct to amount to unlawful harassment.370
Taken as a whole, the most recent cases applying the reasonable belief
requirement paint a picture that contrasts starkly with judicial rhetoric
about the generosity of the reasonable belief standard as an alternative to
requiring the challenged conduct to actually violate Title VII.371 Although
courts continue to tout the liberality of the reasonable belief doctrine for
going beyond opposition to conduct that is actually illegal, instances of
judicial generosity in applying the reasonable belief standard are in fact few
and far between.372
An employee who complains of perceived
discrimination without sufficient factual or legal support to withstand
summary judgment on a legal challenge to the underlying discrimination
may have no legal recourse for the retaliation that follows.

369. Id. at *4 (quoting Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No
Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶ 7, Lowry, 2006 WL 2583224 (No. 1:05-cv-1970-WSD)). The court
also faulted the plaintiff for insufficient proof of causation and for failing to report the conduct to
the proper persons, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s efforts in leaving numerous unreturned phone
messages. Id. at *4–5, *12–13.
370. See, e.g., Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 170 F. App’x 853, 856 (4th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff,
a male and self-identified Christian employee, could not reasonably have believed that sexually
explicit jokes and pornography in the workplace was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate
Title VII’s ban on a sexually hostile environment); Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F. App’x 637,
640, 646 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding it unreasonable for plaintiffs to have believed that a single
incident of a male employee entering a women’s dressing room and stopping to “gawk[]” and
“taunt[] [one of them] with hand motions” while they were dressing violated Title VII); Tatt v.
Atlanta Gas Light Co., 138 F. App’x 145, 148 (11th Cir. 2005) (not reasonable for plaintiff to
have believed that supervisor’s once-a-week conduct of pretending to unzip his pants and urinate
all over the paperwork she brought him and daily obnoxious, although not necessarily sexual,
taunts violated Title VII).
371. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 345 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that
employees “are not required to collect enough evidence of discrimination to put the
discrimination case before a jury before they blow the whistle”); Geer v. Marco Warehousing,
Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“The action opposed need not have actually
been sexual harassment, however. It would be impertinent of the court to require lay persons to
possess an intimate understanding of the law, particularly in an area as nuanced as this one.”).
372. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Smurfit Stone Container Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011–20
(S.D. Ala. 2007); Garcia v. Lewis, No. 05 Civ. 1153(SAS), 2005 WL 1423253, at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2005).
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As these cases show, many courts effectively equate a reasonable
belief in unlawful discrimination with the actuality of unlawful
discrimination.
Particularly when it comes to mistaken legal
understandings, there is very little room for employee error. As one district
court forthrightly described the reasonable belief standard and its
relationship to actual unlawful discrimination,
[t]he critical inquiry is whether plaintiff has a reasonable, good faith
belief that he opposes conduct that is unlawful under Title VII.
However, whether it is reasonable for a plaintiff to believe that the
conduct is unlawful under Title VII depends on whether, as a general
matter, the underlying conduct is unlawful under Title VII.373
The circularity here is notable. If the conduct opposed turns out not to
violate Title VII, employees take a considerable risk in reporting or
challenging it.
3. The Expansion of the Reasonable Belief Doctrine: The Shrinking
Protection of the Participation Clause and the Increasing Privatization of
Discrimination Complaints
It is tempting to think, based on the earlier discussion locating the
origins of the reasonable belief standard in the language of the opposition
clause, that the problems created by the above body of case law might be
avoided by filing a discrimination complaint directly with the EEOC and
bypassing employer channels for complaining, thereby triggering the
broader protection of the participation clause and steering clear of the
reasonable belief doctrine in an action for subsequent retaliation. There are
two problems with this as a strategy for escaping the reasonable belief
predicament.
First, it is no longer so clear that the reasonable belief requirement
applies only to retaliation claims that fall under the opposition clause.
Recent case law suggests that the reasonable belief test developed under the
opposition clause is beginning to bleed into participation clause claims as
well.374 In light of this trend, it is no longer clear that an employee may
373. Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, Okla., No. 07-CV-0018-CVE-FHM, 2007 WL 1574762,
at *3 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007); see also Bazemore v. Ga. Tech. Auth., No. 1:05-cv-1850WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL 917280, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (“To determine whether
Plaintiff’s belief was objectively reasonable, the Court must analyze, under substantive law,
whether Defendants actually engaged in an unlawful employment practice by disciplining him
more severely than [a similarly situated white female].”).
374. See Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891–92 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that both
the participation clause and the opposition clause require “the same threshold standard” of
reasonableness); Neely, 2007 WL 1574762, at *1–2 (construing Tenth Circuit precedent to
require the application of Breeden’s reasonable belief requirement to retaliation claims brought
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avoid the reasonable belief requirement by foregoing internal complaint
procedures and filing directly with the EEOC.
Second, and most importantly, in the current environment of employer
privatization of discrimination claims and the increasing pressure to
channel discrimination complaints into employer grievance processes, it is
utterly unrealistic to expect employees to bypass such procedures, remain
silent about their concerns, and go straight to the EEOC. Indeed, the
increasing privatization of employment discrimination disputes has made
the reasonable belief doctrine all the more problematic.
As discussed previously, employers increasingly instruct employees to
report perceived discrimination and harassment internally through
employer-specified procedures.375 Training of employees on sexual
harassment and discrimination policies and the channels for reporting has
become a cottage industry.376 This trend has effectively expanded the
scope of the increasingly strict reasonable belief test in the post-Breeden
environment. Because employee participation in such procedures falls
under the opposition clause rather than the participation clause,377 the trend
under the participation clause); see also Moore, 461 F.3d at 341 (describing applicable standard
as requiring an objectively reasonable belief without distinguishing between the opposition and
participation clauses); Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir.
2003) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenge to retaliation claims based on the court’s view
that such claims require an objectively reasonable belief in underlying discrimination, without
distinguishing between the opposition and participation clauses); Bazemore, 2007 WL 917280, at
*2 (requiring plaintiff to show an objectively reasonable belief but not discussing the opposition
or participation clauses); Soto v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 6:04-CV-782-ORL28JGG, 2005 WL
2861116, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2005) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has not decided
whether an objective reasonable belief requirement applies to participation clause claims). In our
view, the application of the reasonable belief test to participation clause claims rests on a
misreading of Breeden, since the participation clause claim in that case was disposed of on the
alternate ground of causation, but could have been easily swept into the reasonable belief analysis
had that standard applied. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271–73 (2001).
375. See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text.
376. See Grossman, supra note 92, at 17–22 (describing the role of human resources culture
in the proliferation of antiharassment policies, procedures, and training).
377. Lower courts have required a prior EEOC filing in order to consider an employee’s
participation in an employer’s internal investigation into discrimination as protected activity
under the participation clause. See, e.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 2003 FED App. 0388P,
¶ 10 (6th Cir.), 348 F.3d 537, 543; EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2
(11th Cir. 2000); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000); Brower v.
Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir.
1990). Our research uncovered only one court decision that treats participation in an employer’s
internal investigation of discrimination, absent or prior to the filing of an EEOC charge, as
protected activity under the participation clause. See Maclean v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2002). This decision relied on a dissenting opinion from the
Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to reconsider its ruling in EEOC v. Total System Services, Inc., 240
F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001), which the district court in Maclean mistakenly referred to as the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit. Maclean, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. Although this court properly
recognized the risks to employees if such conduct were placed outside the participation clause,
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toward privatization has effectively expanded the scope of the reasonable
belief test. Accordingly, the channeling of discrimination complaints into
employers’ internal dispute resolution processes has come at a high cost
that generally has not been acknowledged. To the extent that protection
from retaliation is greater under the participation clause than the opposition
clause, which has long been recognized as the general rule,378 the
privatization of discrimination complaints leaves employees with less
protection from retaliation than if they had initiated formal charges under
the statute in lieu of pursuing internal procedures.
Despite the increasing linkage between employer procedures for
addressing discrimination and Title VII’s liability framework, courts
stubbornly have held that employee participation in an employer’s internal
grievance process is governed only by the opposition clause and not by the
more generous participation clause.379 In order to trigger the participation
clause, courts require a prior filing with the EEOC as a bright-line rule.380
the decision is, unfortunately, an anomalous one and appears to rest on a misreading of circuit
court precedent. Id.
378. See, e.g., Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821, at *1
(9th Cir. July 19, 2000) (noting that protection under the opposition clause required a
“reasonable, good faith belief” that discrimination has occurred while the participation clause has
no such requirement), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at
1175–76 (same); Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the scope of protection is broader under the participation clause than under the
opposition clause); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (same); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980) (same); Pettway v. Am.
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004–07 (5th Cir. 1969) (same).
379. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. However, as this Article was nearing the
final stages of publication, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 2006 FED App. 0828N (6th Cir.), 211 F. App’x 373,
cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008) (No. 06-1595). In that case, the Sixth
Circuit denied the plaintiff relief under both the participation and opposition clauses in her claim
that she was fired for cooperating as a witness in the employer’s internal investigation of sexual
harassment allegations by a coworker. Id. ¶¶ 1–10, 211 F. App’x at 374–76. This case provides
the Court with the opportunity to reject this line of cases and hold that employee participation in
an employer investigation into discrimination is protected under the participation clause
regardless of whether or when an EEOC charge was filed. The United States, in an amicus curiae
brief urging the Court to grant the writ of certiorari, has taken the position that the Court should
correct this reading of the participation clause. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–14, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (No. 06-1595). On the other hand, the Court
could decide the case on narrower grounds by overturning the Sixth Circuit’s outrageous ruling
that the plaintiff did not “oppose” discrimination when she gave testimony corroborating
allegations of discrimination against the employee relations director. If the Court upholds the
plaintiff’s claim under the opposition clause, it would not have to reach the Sixth Circuit’s ruling
under the participation clause. We hope the Court accepts the government’s invitation to reject
the lower court’s narrow reading of the participation clause, for the reasons explained in this
Article.
380. There is, however, an exception to this bright-line rule where the employer knows that
an employee is about to file an EEOC charge and acts preemptively to retaliate. See, e.g., Geer v.
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Even if an EEOC charge is eventually filed, employee participation in an
employer’s internal proceedings before the charge was filed falls under the
opposition clause and not the participation clause. Consequently, any
communications about alleged discrimination that occur before an EEOC
charge has been filed are not protected from retaliation unless they pass the
reasonable belief test under the opposition clause.381
The courts’ insistence on a prior EEOC filing as a prerequisite for
establishing “participation” in Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms rests on
an increasingly obsolete distinction between Title VII’s statutorily
specified enforcement provisions and voluntary, proactive measures to
address discrimination. As discussed above, recent developments in Title
VII case law, including the Faragher/Ellerth and Kolstad cases, place
strong legal incentives on employers to address discrimination internally in
order to minimize their potential Title VII liability. Treating employee
participation in employer IDR processes for addressing discrimination as
separate from official Title VII enforcement mechanisms makes little sense
in the current environment, where such processes have been specifically
developed for the very purpose of ensuring Title VII compliance.382 Thus,
the courts’ distinction between the enforcement processes specified in the
statute and employers’ voluntary dispute resolution processes has become
increasingly artificial. The failure of courts to recognize the fallacy of this
Marco Warehousing, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (acknowledging that the
participation clause may extend to “the expression of an intent to file a charge” because
“employees should not be bullied out of filing E.E.O.C. charges”). However, this exception is
limited by the specificity courts require in showing that the employee made a specific, imminent
threat to file a charge, rather than mere vague statements and speculative intentions. See, e.g.,
Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s conversation with an internal
EEO officer inquiring about her EEO options and the plaintiff’s conversation with the employer’s
human relations office the next day in which she vaguely threatened legal action did not trigger
protection under the participation clause); Geer, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1336, 1343 (plaintiff’s actions
in seeking the advice of an attorney, sending a certified letter specifically stating that she was the
victim of sexual harassment, and putting her employer on notice that “attorneys might involve
themselves in the matter,” did not amount to a threat to file a formal EEOC charge as required to
trigger the participation clause).
381. See, e.g., Abbott, 2003 FED App. 0338P, ¶ 10, 348 F.3d at 543 (stating, with respect to
participation clause coverage, “Title VII protects an employee’s participation in an employer’s
internal investigation into allegations of unlawful discrimination where that investigation occurs
pursuant to a pending EEOC charge”); Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174 (stating that protected
activity under the participation clause “does not include participating in an employer’s internal,
in-house investigation, conducted apart from a formal charge with the EEOC”); Booker, 879 F.2d
at 1313 (stating that “the instigation of proceedings leading to the filing of a complaint or a
charge . . . is a prerequisite to protection under the participation clause,” and “any activity by the
employee prior to the instigation of statutory proceedings is to be considered pursuant to the
opposition clause”).
382. The United States made a similar argument in its amicus curiae brief supporting the
request for certiorari in Crawford. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 379, at 6.
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distinction leaves employees with less protection from retaliation than if
employer IDR processes did not exist. That is an odd result for a statute
that purports to encourage employers to take voluntary compliance
measures as a way of expanding the protections from discrimination for the
benefit of employees.383
*

*

*

Recent trends in retaliation law provide increasingly diluted protection
from retaliation for engaging in rights-claiming behavior. These trends
contrast starkly with courts’ repeated exhortations about the generosity of
Title VII protections. While the reality of protection falls far short, the
rhetoric of broad protection feeds into and reinforces the strictness of the
timely complaint doctrines. The shibboleth allows courts to insist that fear
of retaliation provides no excuse for not reporting or complaining of
discrimination without delay, while the employees who do complain take
great risks if they find themselves in need of the promised protection.
CONCLUSION
Negative reaction to the Supreme Court’s recent Ledbetter decision
was swift and fervent.384 Critics chastised the Court for tightly restricting
the time for filing pay discrimination claims without sufficient attention to
the difficulties people face in discerning whether they are paid fairly.385
The introduction of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 and its recent
passage in the U.S. House of Representatives suggest that the time may be

383. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1974) (describing Title VII’s
“prophylactic” purpose of encouraging voluntary self-compliance for the sake of protecting
workers from discrimination).
384. For a taste of some of the many editorial pieces criticizing the Court’s decision, see
Clarence Page, Op-Ed., Supreme Injustice on Worker Equality, BALT. SUN, June 5, 2007, at 11A;
Editorial, An Absurd Bias Ruling, HARTFORD COURANT, June 5, 2007, at A10; Editorial,
Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18; Editorial, Life vs. the Law, L.A. TIMES,
May 31, 2007, at A26; Editorial, A Matter of Justice: Congress Should Correct Ruling on Fair
Pay, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 5, 2007, at 14A; Editorial, Narrow and Insidious, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, May 31, 2007, at D8; Editorial, Sterile Thinking on Pay Equity, CHI. TRIB., June
4, 2007, § 1, at 18; Supreme Letdown; The High Court Finds a Way To Accept Discrimination,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 6, 2007, at B6.
385. Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST, May 30,
2007, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices’ Ruling Limits Lawsuits on Pay Disparity, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2007, at A1; Francine Knowles, Top Court Limits Pay Discrimination Suits; Decision
Could Hamper Future Cases, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 30, 2007, at 63; Jacqueline Palank,
Democrats Will Try To Counter Ruling on Discrimination Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at
A13.
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ripe for evaluating the fairness of Title VII’s rights-claiming system more
broadly.386
Ledbetter is an important and unfortunate decision for employees who
experience pay discrimination, but its impact is better understood as a
“piling on” rather than an anomalous roadblock for employees in need of
the law’s protections. Increasingly demanding doctrines at each end of the
rights-claiming process fail employees, closing off Title VII’s substantive
protections to all but the most vigilant and assertive workers and leaving
even those employees who do assert their rights in time at great risk of
retaliation.
These doctrines work synergistically to reinforce the
widespread and endemic reluctance to perceive and claim discrimination
that is documented by social science literature. As Beth Quinn observed in
a study of harassment complaints, “[t]he power of the law as a tool rests in
the power of the victim to complain in legally sanctioned ways.”387 Our
analysis of rights-claiming doctrines suggests that law’s power, understood
in this way, has been curtailed. Title VII thus does not live up to Felstiner,
Abel, and Sarat’s measure of a “healthy social order,” as one that
“minimizes barriers inhibiting the emergence of grievances and disputes
and preventing their translation into claims for redress.”388
The past decade’s surge of employer policies and procedures for
resolving discrimination complaints internally plays an important role in
contributing to the problems we identify. The channeling of discrimination
complaints into internal employer processes intersects with both ends of the
doctrine: the timely filing rules and the retaliation protections. By failing
to toll the limitations period on formal remedies, participation in internal
grievance processes can run out the clock on an unsuspecting employee’s
formal assertion of rights.
In addition, because employer
nondiscrimination policies shape employees’ beliefs about the scope of
discrimination law, and because participation in such processes falls under
Title VII’s opposition clause instead of its more generous participation
clause, employees who participate in such processes may find themselves
without protection from retaliation if their perception of unlawful
discrimination turns out to be false. Supporters of an expanded role for
such internal processes have failed to consider the full costs of such
measures, at least under existing doctrine. In the current Title VII rightsclaiming framework, such measures risk supplanting, not merely
supplementing, Title VII’s formal mechanisms for protecting substantive
rights.
386. See supra note 1.
387. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 1155.
388. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 6, at 654.
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As a whole, our analysis suggests much deeper problems than those
created by the Court’s Ledbetter decision alone. Salvaging meaningful
access to Title VII’s substantive protections requires a much broader look
at the flaws of Title VII as a rights-claiming system.

